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ABSTRACT

Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is a special case of mobile networks, where vehicles equipped
with computing/communicating devices (called “smart vehicles”) are the mobile wireless nodes.
However, the movement pattern of these mobile wireless nodes is no more random, as in case of
mobile networks, rather it is restricted to roads and streets. Vehicular networks have hybrid
architecture; it is a combination of both infrastructure and infrastructure-less architectures. The
direct vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication is infrastructure-less or ad hoc in nature. Here the
vehicles traveling within communication range of each other form an ad hoc network. On the other
hand, the vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communication has infrastructure architecture where
vehicles connect to access points deployed along roads. These access points are known as road side
units (RSUs) and vehicles communicate with other vehicles/wired nodes through these RSUs. To
provide various services to vehicles, RSUs are generally connected to each other and to the Internet.
The direct RSU to RSU communication is also referred as I2I communication.

The success of VANET depends on the existence of pervasive roadside infrastructure and sufficient
number of smart vehicles. Most VANET applications and services are based on either one or both
of these requirements. A fully matured VANET will have pervasive roadside network and enough
vehicle density to enable VANET applications. However, the initial deployment stage of VANET
will be characterized by the lack of pervasive roadside infrastructure and low market penetration of
smart vehicles. It will be economically infeasible to initially install a pervasive and fully networked
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roadside infrastructure, which could result in the failure of applications and services that depend on
V2I or I2I communications. Further, low market penetration means there are insufficient number of
smart vehicles to enable V2V communication, which could result in failure of services and
applications that depend on V2V communications. Non-availability of pervasive connectivity to
certification authorities and dynamic locations of each vehicle will make it difficult and expensive to
implement security solutions that are based on some central certificate management authority. Nonavailability of pervasive connectivity will also affect the backend connectivity of vehicles to the
Internet or the rest of the world.

Due to economic considerations, the installation of roadside infrastructure will take a long time and
will be incremental thus resulting in a heterogeneous infrastructure with non-consistent capabilities.
Similarly, smart vehicles will also have varying degree of capabilities. This will result in failure of
applications and services that have very strict requirements on V2I or V2V communications.

We have proposed several solutions to overcome the challenges described above that will be faced
during the initial deployment stage of VANET. Specifically, we have proposed:


A VANET architecture that can provide services with limited number of heterogeneous
roadside units and smart vehicles with varying capabilities.



A backend connectivity solution that provides connectivity between the Internet and smart
vehicles without requiring pervasive roadside infrastructure or large number of smart
vehicles.



A security architecture that does not depend on pervasive roadside infrastructure or a fully
connected V2V network and fulfills all the security requirements.
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Optimization solutions for placement of a limited number of RSUs within a given area to
provide best possible service to smart vehicles. The optimal placement solutions cover both
urban areas and highways environments.
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CHAPTER 1

1.1

INTRODUCTION

Overview: Vehicular Networks

Wireless Networks can have infrastructure or infrastructure-less architecture. In infrastructure
wireless networks, wireless nodes communicate with other wireless/wired nodes through an access
point (AP) and no direct communication takes place between the wireless nodes. Whereas, in
infrastructure-less wireless networks, there is no AP and wireless nodes communicate with other
wireless nodes directly. The infrastructure-less wireless network is also known as ad hoc network or
mobile ad hoc network (MANET) since the wireless nodes are usually mobile. Vehicles when
equipped with computing/communicating devices (or On-Board Units - OBUs) also become mobile
wireless nodes (sometimes referred as “smart car(s)” or “smart vehicle(s)”) and the network
becomes Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). Vehicular networks are a special case of mobile
networks; the movement pattern of mobile wireless nodes is no more random rather it is restricted
to roads and streets.

Vehicular networks have hybrid architecture; it is a combination of both infrastructure and
infrastructure-less architectures. The direct vehicle to vehicle communication commonly referred as
V2V communication is infrastructure-less or ad hoc in nature. Here the vehicles traveling within
communication range of each other form an ad hoc network. Whereas the vehicle to infrastructure
communication also referred as V2I communication has infrastructure architecture. The vehicles
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connect to access points deployed along the road. These access points are known as road side units
(RSUs) and vehicles communicate with other vehicles/wired nodes through these RSUs. To provide
various services to vehicles, RSUs are generally connected to other RSUs and to the Internet (like a
distribution system in IEEE 802.11 architecture [1]). The direct RSU to RSU communication is also
referred as I2I communication. An example of a VANET is shown in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1: Vehicular ad hoc network - VANET

The architectural components of VANET include vehicles, roadside units (RSUs), I2I network,
back-end connection of I2I network to Internet and some kind of management authority. The
communication components of VANET include V2V communication, V2I or I2V communication
and I2I communication. V2V and V2I communications complement each other. A pervasive RSU
deployment with an elaborate I2I network will provide pervasive V2I communication that can
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provide a service without any need of V2V communication. And on the other hand, a fully
connected V2V network can overcome the absence of an elaborate V2I communication.

The nodes in VANET are highly mobile as compared to that of MANET but the mobility is
restricted to roads/streets and is also affected by traffic conditions. The traffic conditions vary both
temporarily and spatially. These characteristics result in highly dynamic network topology with
frequent connections/disconnections. The presence of buildings and other manmade architectures
alongside roads restrict the communication direction and range. The connection times are therefore
very short due to high node mobility and existence of these obstacles. Vehicles tend to move in
packets with large gaps between packets thus resulting in disconnected networks. As compared to
MANET, VANET does not suffer from limitation of power and storage. As compared to other
wireless/wired networks the applications and services of VANET are strongly related to location.

Efforts for standardization of vehicular communications/networks have long been done by
different standard organizations such as International Standard Organization (ISO), European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
(IEEE). ISO’s TC 204 WG 16 (Technical Committee 204 Working Group 16) is handling the
standardization initiative and is called CALM (started as “Communications, Air-interface, Long and
Medium range” and is now “"Communications Access for Land Mobiles”) [2]. ETSI’s TC ITS
(Technical Committee on Intelligent Transportation Systems) has five Working Groups (WG1-5)
working in this direction [3]. IEEE’s 1609 WG (Dedicated Short Range Communication Working
Group) is working to develop IEEE 1609 family of standards for vehicular networks also referred as
WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments) [4]. IEEE 1609 family of standard includes
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IEEE 1609.0,1,2,3,4, IEEE 1609.11 and IEEE 802.11p [5-11]. IEEE 802.11p [11] amends IEEE
802.11 [12] for access in vehicular environments and is based on Dedicated Short Range
Communications (DSRC) [12]. The relationship among WAVE Model and OSI Model is shown in
Figure 1.2 [13].

OSI
Reference
Model
Application,
Presentation,
Session

WAVE Model
IEEE 1609.1,
et al.

Upper Layers

IEEE 1609.3

Networking
Services

IEEE 802.2

LLC Sub Layer

Data

IEEE 1609.4,
IEEE 802.11

MAC Sub Layer

Physical

IEEE 802.11p

PHY Layer

Transport
Network

Security
Services

IEEE 1609.2

Figure 1.2: Relationship among WAVE Standards Family

1.2

Motivation

The success of VANET depends on existence of pervasive roadside infrastructure and sufficient
number of smart vehicles. Most of the VANET applications and services are based on either one or
both of these requirements. Initial deployment stage of VANET will be characterized by lack of
pervasive roadside infrastructure and low market penetration of smart vehicles.

It will not be economically feasible to initially install a pervasive and fully networked roadside
infrastructure. This will result in intermittent V2I and backend connectivity, causing failure of
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services and applications that depend on this type of communication. The lack of infrastructure will
remain a reality in rural areas and along highways even after the initial deployment stage. Further,
backend connectivity will also remain an issue in rural areas and along highways even after the initial
deployment stage of VANET.

Low market penetration will result in insufficient number of smart vehicles to enable V2V
communication, thus causing failure of services and applications that depend on V2V
communications (such as accidents report) [14]. Low density of smart vehicles will reduce the
connection time between vehicles [15]. Low density of smart vehicles will also result in sparse and
disconnected networks.

Expensive installation and maintenance of roadside infrastructure will make the services expensive
to users, thus reducing the rate of market penetration that in turn will make investment in
infrastructure further unattractive for service providers. There will be a need to optimally place the
limited number of roadside units to provide best service to smart vehicles.

During the initial deployment stage, due to non-availability of pervasive connectivity to certification
authorities and dynamic locations of each vehicle, it will be difficult and expensive to have security
solutions based on some central certificate management authority.

Due to economical considerations the installation of roadside infrastructure will take a long time and
will be incremental thus resulting in a heterogeneous infrastructure with non-consistent capabilities.

5

Similarly, smart vehicles will also have varying degree of capabilities. This will result in failure of
applications and services that have very strict requirements on V2I or V2V communications.

1.3

Proposed Work and Contributions

The proposed work is to overcome the challenges that will be faced during initial deployment stage
of VANET. The contributions of this dissertation are summarized below.


Design of a VANET architecture that does not need expensive roadside infrastructure or
large number of smart vehicles, can provide services with limited number of heterogeneous
roadside units and smart vehicles with varying capabilities, is scalable and deployable.



Provision of backend connectivity to Internet to smart vehicles without requiring pervasive
roadside infrastructure or large number of smart vehicles, especially in rural areas and along
highways.



Design of security architecture that does not depend on pervasive roadside infrastructure or
a fully connected V2V network. The architecture is economical, scalable and deployable.



Optimal placement of limited number of RSUs within a given area to provide best possible
service to smart vehicles. The optimal placement solution covers both environments: the
urban areas and the highways.

1.4

Organization of Dissertation

Remainder of dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives the design of an economical and
deployable VANET architecture. Chapter 3 presents a backend connectivity solution using satellite
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receive only terminals. Chapter 4 discusses security architecture for VANET initial deployment
stage. Chapter 5 presents solutions for optimal placement of limited number of RSUs in two distinct
environments; along highways and in urban areas. Finally, Chapter 6 gives the conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2

AN ECONOMICAL AND DEPLOYABLE VANET

Although there is plenty of research on VANET, the solutions to the challenges existing during the
long transition period in VANET deployment are largely ignored. There are some research solutions
that offset the absence of roadside architecture by either not relying on it (i.e., using only V2V
communication), or using cellular architecture, or using existing available Wi-Fi hotspots, or using
static/mobile relay units (Delay tolerant networks) [9, 10, 12, 16, 18, 24]. Most of these approaches
target specific applications and may not be easily upgradable (during later stages) to VANET
architecture (such as those defined by IEEE P1609 working group). There is also lack of research
on how to provide incentive for vehicle owners to install wireless devices, especially when support
from roadside infrastructure is insufficient and very limited number of smart vehicles are on the
road.

We present an economical and deployable VANET system design to solve these challenges. Our
focus is to provide a transitional/interim solution that can be used to start up (or give impetus) to
VANET activities, during the long initial transition period, by making VANET easy to deploy,
secure and economical. At the same time the design should be incremental/progressive and should
be easily transformed into architectures that are already specified in VANET standards/protocols
without requiring any major revamp/modifications. From now on we will mostly refer “smart
vehicles” as “vehicles” without considering any vehicle that has no communication device, unless
there is a need to explicitly mention smart vehicles.
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The contribution of this solution is a VANET system design, for the long initial transition period,
that is economical, realistic, incremental and deployable. Core component in our design, the
Roadside Units (RSUs), can be standalone with minimum intelligence in their basic form. Our
proposed design does not require RSUs to be interconnected or connected to the Internet. We
present a basic protocol that makes the communication between roadside units possible via mobile
vehicles. The simulation results indicate considerable performance gains by just using standalone
RSUs.

The chapter is organized in five sections. In section 2.1 presents related work. Section 2.2 gives
detailed description of our proposed design. Section 2.3 presents the simulation details. Section 2.4
presents discussion and section 2.5 gives the conclusion.

2.1

Related Works

Most of the existing research in VANET presents routing algorithms for V2V communication [2-4];
these protocols rely on the assumption that sufficient number of vehicles will be available for
relaying messages. Some of the research work also addresses the routing in disconnected or
intermittently connected networks [5-7]. A hybrid approach has also been presented to address
limited connection time between vehicles [8]. However, during the initial deployment there will not
be sufficient number of smart vehicles on the road to even form small clusters for these protocols to
work. Further, lack of roadside infrastructure will make use of hybrid protocols difficult.
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The technique for transmission of data between nodes of a disconnected or partitioned network
using temporary storage at intermediate nodes is a delay tolerant network (DTN) [9]. Besides
satellite networks, the concept of DTN has been widely applied to VANET (which may be
considered as DTN especially during initial deployment stages) [5, 9-13]. It is pertinent to highlight
here that most of the existing research in this context is on V2V communication protocols [5, 10,
11] where mobile nodes temporarily store the message if no route is available and later
opportunistically forward the message. These protocols may be used to solve the disconnected
network problem due to uneven distribution of traffic, but may not be an effective solution to low
penetration rate issues. Throwboxes in UMass’ DieselNet [12] are similar to our standalone RSUs.
The throwboxes act as stationary routers to improve connectivity among mobile nodes (buses) that
are equipped with multiple radios (including a long-range radio), GPS recording devices etc. In our
research the RSUs are not just the routers, but in addition they also receive, process and disseminate
information (such as safety or warning). Mobile nodes in MIT’s CarTel [13] are equipped with
multiple sensors; the data collected from these sensors is processed and transferred to a central
portal by these nodes. The transfer is accomplished opportunistically via Wi-Fi (hotspots, roadside
units), Bluetooth or by nodes themselves (data mules). A specially designed delay-tolerant network
stack (CafNet) is used for communication. Our emphasis is not on making major modification to
existing VANET standards/protocols, but to enable their gradual/incremental deployment during
initial phases.

Infostations architecture allows use of high speed and generally dispersed access points. The access
points/stations afford transfer of high volume of data at cost of connectivity. They can be especially
useful in VANET environment where vehicles are moving at fast speeds and connection time to

11

access points is very limited [14, 15]. This architecture cannot solve the low penetration problem
since the infostations will generally be widely dispersed. Further, these must also be fully networked
with Internet, which will be expensive to install and maintain.

A number of researches have incorporated cellular networks in VANET [16-19]. Cellular networks
are mostly used as a backbone - a replacement to roadside infrastructure. Cellular networks, though
pervasive, offer lower data rates as compared to Wi-Fi (roadside infrastructure). Although with the
advent of 3G/4G technologies data rates close to broadband can be achieved, these technologies are
not uniformly available throughout cellular coverage areas and many users are still dependent on
other heterogeneous technologies (WAP, GPRS, EDGE, HSDPA, etc [20]). Further, cellular data
plans subscriptions are expensive; an unconstrained plan with a 5GB/month limit costs
approximately $700/year. 5GB/month means per day a user on average can send/receive 50 emails
(20 with attachments), download a song and a game/app, view 40 web pages, posts 10 social media
posts with photos, and watch a streaming video of 40 minutes [21]. Although unlimited data plans
and those that cost few ten of dollars are also available, but these have several fine print conditions;
such as ‘usage patterns’ (no file sharing, excessive usage, etc), ‘can only be used on smart phones’
(no tethering), ‘can only access certain service’ (email, predefined websites, etc), and ‘must have a
qualifying voice plan’. Some service providers are charging approximately $2/MB or 1¢/KB for web
browsing. All major cellular service providers are now offering and encouraging users (such as
offering ‘unlimited Wi-Fi usage with data plan’) to access data through hotspots (which use Wi-Fi
just like VANET roadside infrastructure instead of 3G/4G). This also highlights cost/benefit of WiFi over 3G/4G. In addition cellular networks also have few other disadvantages such as expensive
to built/maintain, billing/licensing issues among different service providers, higher roaming rates,
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large and variable latency, central switching/resource management, difficult to scale and occasional
blackouts [20, 22-27].

A class of protocols uses the store-and-forward approach for V2V communications [2, 28]. MDDV
[2] is a multi-hop V2V protocol. It uses predictability of vehicle movement to route the messages. It
assumes the vehicles to be equipped with GPS and digital maps. It uses trajectory and geographical
based forwarding. If end-to-end path does not exist then messages are stored and later forwarded
when a connection is established. VADD [28] is also a multi-hop protocol using the carry-andforward paradigm. In this protocol a vehicle carries a message until it finds another vehicle in
communication range, then it forwards the message. It assumes that the vehicles are equipped with
GPS, digital maps and also have detailed traffic statistics such as vehicle density, vehicle speeds. It
bases its decision of message-forwarding on these statistics. Both the protocols [2, 28] are used to
transfer messages between vehicles in multi hops.

Lochert et al. [29] compare the performance of standalone and networked stationary supporting
units (SSU) in context of low penetration rate. The work focuses on dissemination of information
from a central point in a city scenario. They show that the networked SSUs (connected via a
backbone) improve the performance dramatically as opposed to the standalone SSUs. V2V
communication also plays an important part in their scenario. Whereas in our case we used very
limited penetration rate so that V2V communication is not possible and our results show that
standalone RSUs do increase the performance.
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Our work comes closer to protocols that use vehicles to transfer messages between roadside units
[30-33]. M.C. Chuah et al. [32] present a protocol using multi-hop V2V communication between
roadside units. They present a detailed mechanism for forwarding of messages at each hop. It makes
use of query and response messages at each hop. B. Petit et al. [30] present a set of protocols for
data relaying between roadside units using vehicles. The protocols give different options for transfer
of data between a source/sink and a vehicle. It uses solicit and beacons for selection of appropriate
vehicle to carry the data. The work has been further extended by A. Mansey et al. [33] giving vehicleroadside unit data transfer mechanisms and reliable multi-packet data transfer schemes. The
protocol does not provide details on routing between different roadside units. Y. Ding et al. [31]
present a static node assisted adaptive routing protocol. It is basically a multi hop protocol that
makes use of static nodes at the intersection to store and forward the messages, thus improving
performance over other multi hop V2V communication protocols.

Our research work differs from above mentioned protocols in many ways. We do not assume
vehicles to be equipped with GPS and digital map, or have road statistical data, which makes our
design more realistic especially in the initial transition period. Our design does not involve V2V
communication, thus it works well when smart vehicles are sparsely distributed on roads. We do not
assume roadside units to be always connected to infrastructure (i.e., fully networked or connected to
the Internet), which makes the RSU deployment in our design economical and practical during the
transition stage. We present an integrated design involving vehicles and roadside units with varying
degree of capabilities. Besides being economical, the design is also scalable and can easily be
upgraded without any major modifications in protocol.
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2.2

Proposed Design

The common characteristic of all VANET applications is either collection or dissemination of
information from/to vehicles in a timely and efficient manner. V2V and V2I communications
complement each other in achieving this flow of information. For example, we can overcome the
issue of low market penetration of smart vehicles by having more elaborate roadside infrastructure
(i.e., passing information through fully networked roadside units or using infrastructure to
infrastructure – I2I communication), or conversely, high penetration can overcome lack of roadside
infrastructure or I2I communication (i.e., passing information using V2V communication). As
discussed earlier, during the initial stage of VANET, both V2I (also I2I) and V2V communications
will not be very effective. So we need to address the issues of V2V and V2I connectivity in an
efficient and economical way. Since we cannot influence the market penetration of smart vehicles,
the other solution is to improve V2I and I2I communications; which will, in turn, complement the
lack of V2V communication. One option is to have pervasive fully networked roadside
infrastructure (to improve V2I and I2I communications). Though it may be possible to have such a
network in urban-areas but in rural-areas/along-highways (where there is not much manmade
infrastructure) this option will be quite expensive and impractical. Another option is to use cellular
network as a replacement to roadside infrastructure. Though cellular networks are pervasive, but in
addition to the technical and economical disadvantages mentioned earlier in section 2.1, this option
will also introduce heterogeneous technologies (i.e., typical VANET architecture in urban-areas and
cellular based architecture in rural-areas/along-highways); making the transition to final VANET
architecture difficult.
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We suggest improving connectivity/communication by using roadside units (RSUs). In its basic
form our proposed RSU is standalone with only store-and-forward capability, which makes it
economical and easy to install/maintain, especially in rural-areas or along highways. Other types of
RSUs include those that are locally connected to each other or connected to the Internet (those
located close to manmade infrastructure or in urban-areas). Details of RSU design are given in
Section 4.1. An overview of RSU’s role in achieving different connectivity requirements is given
below:


V2V Communication: Direct multi-hop V2V communication will not be possible during
initial deployment phases due to low market penetration. V2V communication among
vehicles with temporal displacement will be improved using store-and-forward capability of
RSUs and those with spatial displacement will be improved if RSUs are networked. Besides
broadcast communication, one-to-one communication among temporally displaced vehicles
may also be achieved with the support from RSUs if vehicles have fixed routes and travel
schedules (as in the case of daily commute).



V2I Communication: Economical and easy installation/maintenance features of RSUs help
in achieving high RSU densities even in rural areas and along highways; this will help in
improving V2I communication.



I2I Communication: V2I communication is of little use if there is no I2I communication.
RSUs that are connected to each other or to the Internet can easily communicate with each
other. Standalone RSUs can use passing-by vehicles as relays to communicate with each
other.
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Our design integrates RSUs of varying capabilities thus making architecture economical, easy to
install/maintain, incremental/progressive (basic RSUs can easily be upgraded to higher capability
ones), homogenous (same technology in urban and rural areas) and upgradable to final VANET
architecture.

2.2.1

Roadside Unit - RSU

The motivation of our design is to make roadside units light weight, simple/easy to install and
economical. Our proposed design does not require all RSUs to have the same capabilities. Multiple
versions of RSUs enable engineers to have necessary flexibility in designing a VANET architecture
that is suitable to their requirements and budget.

2.2.1.1

Multiple Versions

We define several different versions of RSUs with varying capabilities/functions and network
connectivity. In its basic version, an RSU is a standalone unit with temporary store-and-forward
capability. In terms of connectivity, RSUs can be standalone, locally networked (via wire or wireless
such as WiMax [44]), connected to the Internet via wire or wireless, or just have backend receiveronly capability in order to receive data from satellite, cellular, commercial radio, etc. RSUs may have
sensors for monitoring local weather, road condition, traffic, etc. All RSUs are tamper proof, capable
of receiving and sending data from/to vehicles and have some information processing capabilities.
Possible versions of RSUs are listed in Table 2.1. A possible architecture with standalone, locally
connected and globally connected RSUs is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Table 2.1 Different version of RSUs with increasing functionality. An RSU with a larger version
number will be more expensive but provide more functionality.
Version

Store
and
ForwardRepeater

Intelligent
with
information
processing

Sensors to
collect local
data- traffic,
met etc

Limited
local
connectivity

Backend
Receive
only- Radio,
Satellite

Backend
duplex
connectivity

1.0

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

1.1

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

1.2

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

2.0

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

2.1

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

2.2

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

3.0

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

3.1

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-

Yes

Store-and-forward is the basic capability and enables an RSU to transfer messages between spatially
and temporally displaced vehicles. Intelligent information processing gives RSUs the capability of
encryption/decryption, data verification, provision of time/location stamp, certificate revocation,
etc. Sensors are used to collect local traffic and weather data. This collected data can be used for
verification of data provided by vehicles. Limited local connectivity means an RSU is connected to
at least one adjacent RSU. “Backend receive only” enables reception of critical safety information,
certification revocation lists, etc. It is an economical way to receive important non-local messages
for dissemination to vehicles in an area, such as fire, flood, and earthquake emergency warnings. It
can also be used for distribution of certificate revocation lists to RSUs similar to [34]. “Backend
duplex connectivity” means connection to the Internet; such RSU can send and receive data
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to/from the Internet. Other RSUs can connect to the Internet through the backend duplex
connected RSUs.

RSU
Smart Car
Plain Car

Figure 2.1: The proposed architecture consists of RSUs deployed along the roads. RSUs can be
standalone (the three RSUs on top right), locally connected to adjacent RSU (two on the top-left
corner), or connected to Internet infrastructure (three on the bottom). What versions of RSUs to
install depends on overall budget and services we want to provide.

2.2.1.2

Deployment

Different versions of RSUs help in achieving economical deployment across diverse areas. In urban
areas where Internet connectivity is pervasive, it is economical and easy to deploy Internet
connected RSUs, whereas in rural areas or along highways where it is difficult/expensive to extend
Internet connectivity (though a limited number of RSUs may be connected to Internet through
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cellular network), it is more economical to deploy standalone or locally networked RSUs. These
basic standalone RSUs will help in getting VANET started and later they may be replaced with more
advanced ones without any system overhaul.

Each RSU will have a distinct identification and an associated digital certificate. The certificate
issuing authorities for RSU’s certificates may be organized on area/region basis. All vehicles in
VANET will have certificate-issuing-authority’s certificate and will be capable of verifying RSUs’
certificates and messages signed by these certificates. At startup, a VANET can even have Version
1.0 RSUs without any certificates. These RSUs can be used for only store-and-forward functions and
be deployed at non-critical locations.

Each RSU will be aware of local map, its own location and locations of other RSUs in the area.
Additionally, each RSU will also maintain a routing table with known path to each of the other RSUs
in the area. Initially, this information will be added at the time of installation and later it will be
updated periodically via RSU update messages. For this purpose, each RSU will periodically
exchange signed Hello messages (containing routing table etc) with its neighbors. Routing-tableupdate procedures from any existing table-driven routing protocol may be employed for routing
table updates and the details are hence omitted here. Routing between standalone RSUs relies on the
relay by passing-by vehicles and is directly related to traffic density. If traffic density varies
considerably during different times of day then the routing table may contain multiple entries
accordingly (e.g., one each for morning commutes, one for evening commutes, and one for rest of
the day).

20

2.2.2

V2V Communication

V2V communication is an important part of VANET; many VANET applications (such as
cooperative driving, and safety warnings) depend on V2V communications. However, there will be a
very small number of smart vehicles during the initial deployment phase of VANET and V2V
communication will hardly exist. In such case standalone RSUs (with store-and-forward capability)
can play an important role in achieving limited V2V communication. A sending vehicle sends a
message to a nearby RSU, which stores and later forwards it to another passing-by recipient vehicle.
Though this type of communication cannot be used for time-critical messages but it can still serve as
a means to broadcast non-time-critical messages. If a vehicle has its certificate then it may also sign
the message to ensure its authenticity to a receiver. In this way, a malicious vehicle transferring fake
messages will be held accountable.

If an RSU is networked (locally or with Internet), then the RSU can support V2V communication
between spatially displaced vehicles. This could be useful in quick dissemination of information
within the network or across networks (if the RSU is connected to the Internet).

2.2.3

V2I (Vehicle to RSU) Communication

Our proposed design enables service providers to deploy a relatively large number of RSUs with less
investment thus enabling more V2I communications. Each RSU will advertise its existence and
offered services by broadcasting periodical beacons. The services offered by a particular RSU will
depend on its version/capabilities, e.g., an Internet connected RSU may offer email service whereas
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a standalone RSU may only offer store-and-forward service. If an RSU is capable of sensing nearby
vehicles, it can broadcast its beacon only when a vehicle enters its broadcast range ─ this conserves
power in low traffic conditions. The beacon broadcasting interval (BI) can be defined by the
maximum allowed driving speed (s) and broadcast zone diameter (Zd), i.e., BI = Zd /s.

The beacon will include an RSU’s ID, certificate, location, current time, location of adjacent RSUs,
services offered and critical safety information. Critical safety information is included in beacon to
reduce the information relaying time. The beacon message will be signed by its issuing RSU. Critical
safety information messages may also be broadcasted independent of the beacons. In this case,
critical safety messages will be given priority over other messages. They will be signed by sending
RSUs and will include location of sending RSUs and current time. Vehicles may relay these messages
to other passing-by vehicles.

2.2.4

I2I (RSU to RSU) Communication

I2I communication plays a vital role in both V2V and V2I communications. I2I communication may
be considered a part of V2I communication especially when roadside infrastructure is fully
networked. We consider I2I communication separately because in the initial deployment stage of
VANET, RSUs are not necessarily connected to each other or to the Internet. Data transmission
will normally be limited to adjacent RSUs only. However, there may be situations when a message is
needed to be sent to another RSU that is many hops away, such as sending information about a
malicious vehicle to an RSU that is known to be connected to the Internet, or relaying an accident
report to emergency vehicle that is known to be located near a particular RSU.
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I2I communication, depending on the connectivity of RSUs, can be divided into two types, i.e., I2I
Direct communication and I2I Indirect communication, which will be introduced next.

2.2.4.1

I2I (RSU to RSU) Direct Communication

Some RSUs may be locally connected to adjacent ones. This connectivity can be wired or wireless.
Local connectivity is economical as compared to global connectivity (to the Internet). If two RSUs
are connected to each other then direct I2I communication will be used. For this, existing protocols
(such as those defined by IEEE P1609 working group) may be used, and the details are hence
omitted. There may be a case where part of networking route is connected and part is disconnected;
the connected part will use direct communication whereas the disconnected part will use indirect
communication introduced in the following.

2.2.4.2 I2I (RSU to RSU) Indirect Communication (via Vehicles)

If RSUs are not locally connected, then the RSUs communicate with each other using passing-by
vehicles. A reputation system may be used to solicit vehicles’ cooperation in relaying these messages.
The exact details of such a reputation system are out of the scope and are not discussed. The
addressing information will include the destination RSU’s ID and its location. If the message is for
an RSU that is several hops away then routing information will also be included. Routing
information will include locations and IDs of all intermediate RSUs along the path to the destination
RSU. The message will be signed by its originator and any confidential information will be
encrypted. The certificate of the originator will also be appended with the message.
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The basic idea of opportunistic routing is used in our design. In opportunistic routing, as opposed to
deterministic routing, the node that forwards a message is not predetermined. It is determined on
the fly, normally by a subset of nodes that receive the broadcast [45, 46]. An RSU broadcasts a
message to every vehicle in range. There are two possible options for the selection of relaying
vehicle. In the first option, after receiving the message, each vehicle waits for a random amount of
time and then acknowledges the message. On hearing the acknowledgement sent by one vehicle all
other vehicles will discard the message. Therefore, only one vehicle that acknowledges first is
selected as the message-relay-vehicle.

One possible problem can occur for this option when the relaying vehicle diverts from the route
before delivering the message. In this case the probability of success can be increased by letting
more than one vehicle to relay the message. Another possible issue is the hidden-node problem
(note that the small number of smart vehicles during the initial stage of VANET deployment will
reduce the chances of having a hidden-node); in this case more than one vehicle will acknowledge
and carry the message. This operation will provide redundancy to the protocol, but at the same time,
it will require duplicate suppression at the destination. (Mathematical analysis of the number of
nodes required to deliver a message with certain probability of confidence is discussed later).

Acknowledgement messages will be restricted to only one hop. End-to-end acknowledgement may
be included as an optional service. The calculation of acknowledgement timeout is discussed later.
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2.2.4.2.1 Operation

When an RSU broadcasts a message, each receiving vehicle compares the destination location with
its direction of travel and discards the message if it is for an RSU on the opposite direction. For a
vehicle not equipped with GPS, we have two options to determine its direction of travel relative to
the location of destination RSU. First, the vehicle can use the location of RSU it has just passed and
the location of current RSU to determine its direction of travel. Second, in the message the sendingRSU can include the previous-RSU’s ID that a vehicle must have passed, if it is along the desired
direction.

A relaying vehicle passes the message to each intermediate RSU that is listed in the routing path of
the message. When an RSU receives a message, it checks message integrity and then sends an
acknowledgement to its immediate upstream RSU according to the routing information contained in
the message. If the message has been received before, it is discarded and only the acknowledgement
is sent. This ensures duplicate elimination on a per hop basis.

If the message receiving RSU is not the destination RSU, it rebroadcasts the message to the next
RSU in the routing path. It then waits for an acknowledgment from the next RSU; waiting time is
defined by acknowledgement-wait-time (details in next section). If no acknowledgement is received
till the expiration of acknowledgement-wait-time, it rebroadcasts the message. The process is then
repeated for a fixed number of times. This guards against network overloading since there may be
the cases when a message has been received but acknowledgement cannot be sent due to lack of
upstream vehicular traffic. The acknowledgement generated by the destination RSU may be sent

25

back to the source RSU as an optional service. An example flow of message and its
acknowledgements is shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3.

R2

R1

R3

M1

t1

V1, V2
M1

t2

t3

R4

V2
V4

V3

M1

AckR2
V3

M1

t4

t5

V5
AckR3

AckR4

V6

t6

Figure 2.2: Flow of a message and its acknowledgement between RSU1 and RSU4 (illustrated also in
Figure 2.3). Message M1 is sent from RSU1 to RSU4 via RSU2 and RSU3. ti represents time in order.
Ri represents RSUi. Vi represents vehicle i that carries a message. AckRi is the acknowledgement
message from RSUi to RSUi-1.

A vehicle may deliver the same message to more than one consecutive RSUs, for example, in Figure
2.2 and 2.3, vehicle V2 delivers message M1 to RSU2 and RSU3. In order to take advantage of this
situation, each receiving RSU waits for acknowledgement from its next RSU on the routing path
before re-broadcasting the message, since the vehicle that has delivered the message may also deliver
the message to the next RSU. But if the traffic density is low, the receiving RSU may rebroadcast the
message before the end of the wait timer (to simplify the logic the RSU may rebroadcast the
message before starting the wait timer).
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Figure 2.3:
Snapshots of the road conditions when a message is sent from RSU1 to RSU4 via
RSU2 and RSU3 (illustrated also in Figure 2). (a) V1 and V2 receive the message from RSU1. (b) V1
and V2 deliver the message to RSU2, V1 diverts to its right at road junction, V3 and V4 approach
RSU2. (c) V2 delivers the message to RSU3, V3 receives the message from RSU2, V4 carries the
acknowledgement message from RSU2 for RSU1. (d) V3 delivers the message to RSU4, V5 approaches
RSU3. (e) V6 receives the acknowledgement message from RSU4 for RSU3; V5 carries the
acknowledgement message from RSU3 for RSU2. (f) The acknowledgement messages delivered by
V6 and V5 to RSU3 and RSU2 respectively.
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2.2.4.2.2 Acknowledgement Wait Time

Each RSU waits for its acknowledgement before retransmitting. The wait time (Wt) depends on the
distance to the next RSU, the average speed of vehicles and traffic conditions. It is directly related to
distance (L) and inversely related to vehicle speed (s) and traffic density (d) (upstream),

Wt  2

L 1
 
s ds

(2.1)

Where  is a constant which caters for processing done at a node before sending the
acknowledgement.

The final wait time will be estimated using equation 2.3. Here  is the smoothing factor, M is the
acknowledgement arrival time and D is the smoothed deviation (similar to TCP round-trip-time
estimation model [47])
D  D  1   Wt  M

(2.2)

TimeOut  Wt  4  D

(2.3)

2.2.4.2.3 Number of Relay Vehicles

We cannot be sure that a vehicle which has passed the source RSU and is carrying the message will
always pass the destination RSU without diverting on the way. Therefore, we want to estimate the
number of times a source should relay the message to have some degree of confidence that the
message will reach the destination.
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Suppose between two RSUs, there are one or several road diversions. Among the traffic flow
entering from the source RSU, only p fraction of flow goes to the destination RSU. N represents the
number of vehicles passing the source RSU; the random variable X represents the number of
vehicles that have passed by the source and will also pass the destination RSU (Figure 2.4). Let’s find
out how many vehicles (N) should the source RSU ask to carry the message, in order to let the
destination RSU have at least k vehicles passing through it, with a confidence of probability Pc (such
as 95%).

Because each vehicle has an independent probability p to go to the destination RSU, the random
variable X follows Binomial distribution. If we denote f (n; N , p) as the probability of exactly n
vehicles going through the destination, then according to Binomial distribution, we can derive:
N
f (n; N , p)    p n (1  p) N  n
n

(2.4)

Source
N

Destination

p

X

Figure 2.4: Number of relay vehicles depends on the probability of vehicles passing the destination.
N is the total number of vehicles passing the source, X is the random variable representing the
number of vehicles that have passed source and will also pass the destination.
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The question we asked above means that the probability of having less than k vehicles passing
through the destination RSU must be no more than 1-Pc. Thus the following inequality formula must
be satisfied:
f (0; N , p)  f (1; N , p)  ...  f (k  1; N , p)  1  Pc

(2.5)

For k>1 (which will be the case if we want more than one vehicle to deliver the message for
redundancy or security purposes) Equation 2.5 does not have a closed-form solution. To derive the
value of N, we can test N=1, N=2, N=3,..., until we find the smallest value of N satisfying the
formula.

When k=1, the above formula means that the value of N must satisfy:
(1  p) N  1  Pc

(2.6)

or N  log(1  Pc )

(2.7)

log(1  p)

Equation 2.7 gives the minimum number of vehicles that are required to carry a message in order for
at least one vehicle passing the destination (with certain confidence level). Figure 2.5 shows the
number of vehicles required for different values of p.

2.2.4.2.4 Protocol Simplification based on GPS Data

The large scale use of GPS technology has made GPS devices economical; it is likely that in the near
future all modern vehicles will be equipped with GPS devices; GPS devices provide valuable data
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such as up-to-date location, direction and speed. In addition, when a GPS device is used for
navigation, it can provide destination and trajectory information. These additional data can be used
to make the communication protocol simpler and more efficient.
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Figure 2.5: Number of relay vehicles (N) required to deliver a message to the destination (by at least
one vehicle) with a 95% probability of confidence (Pc) for different probabilities (p) that a vehicle
passing the source will also pass the destination. For example, if p = 0.5 and Pc = 0.95, we get N=5
which means that in order to have 95% confidence that a message sent by the source reaches the
destination, we need to relay the message through at least 5 vehicles.

An RSU can query a passing-by vehicle for destination and trajectory information. Based on this
information, the RSU can decide whether or not to choose the vehicle for forwarding messages to
other RSUs. This will reduce the number of vehicles used to relay any given message. One possible
implication of this is privacy; the owner of a vehicle may not want to disclose the vehicle’s
destination or trajectory information to RSUs. This can be easily resolved as follows: When an RSU
offers a message to a vehicle, it also includes the destination information of the message. The vehicle
can then reply either “YES” if it can carry the message or “NO” if it cannot carry the message based
on its driving trajectory. The vehicle may also choose to reply “Do not Know” if it does not want to
disclose any information about its destination; in this case, the original protocol can be used.
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In this modified protocol, an RSU will relay a message to the minimum number of required vehicles;
sometimes just one vehicle will be enough. However, this makes the protocol more prone to
message dropping attacks (a malicious vehicle accepts a message for relaying but does not deliver it
to the destination). Possible solutions include the use of end-to-end acknowledgement or an increase
in redundancy by using more than the minimum required vehicles for message relay.

2.3

Simulations

Simulations were carried out to check the effectiveness of our proposed system. The simulator does
not incorporate the details of lower level protocol layers (i.e., physical and MAC layers). All
simulated vehicles and RSUs have the same transmission and reception ranges. A message transfer
between a source and a destination is assumed to be successful if both entities are within the
communication range of each other.

2.3.1

Simulation Scenario I

This set of simulations were carried out to find the minimum number of vehicles required to
successfully transfer a message from a source RSU to a destination RSU with a given probability of
confidence. A region of 25000m×6250m with road network as shown in Figure 2.4 was simulated.
When a vehicle traveling towards the destination RSU passes the source RSU, the source RSU
transmits the message to the vehicle. The message is then carried by the vehicle for possible delivery
to the destination RSU. At each road junction, the vehicle decides to either maintain its direction of
travel or divert according to a predefined probability. If the vehicle diverts and hence fails to deliver
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the message to the destination RSU, the source RSU retransmits the message. This procedure is
repeated until the message is successfully received by the destination RSU. In each simulation run,
the source RSU sends 1000 messages and the number of retransmissions for each message is
recorded. The simulation is repeated 100,000 times and the average number of messages received
successfully after a particular number of retransmissions is recorded.

Figure 2.6(a) shows the number of messages successfully received (Y-axis) using a particular number
of retransmissions (X-axis) for p = 0.2 and p = 0.6 (p is the probability that a vehicle passing the
source will also pass the destination). It shows that, for p = 0.6 case, more than 90% of messages
can be successfully received by receiver within 4 retransmissions. From a different perspective,
Figure 2.6(b) shows the number of received messages at the destination after less than or equal to
each given number of retransmissions. Figure 2.6(b) can be used to find the minimum number of
vehicles required to successfully transmit a message with a certain probability of confidence. Figure
2.6(c) shows the number of vehicles required for confidence Pc = 95% for each probability p. The
simulation results shown in Figure 2.6(c) are identical to the analytical results presented in Figure 2.5.

2.3.2

Simulation Scenario II

During the initial stages of VANET deployment, V2V communication will not be very effective. In
addition, due to limited road infrastructure, the V2I communication will also be very limited. This
will be a major setback to all VANET applications, such as transfer of a safety message from a point
of incident to vehicles entering the area, or information about road blockage for possible diversion.
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Figure 2.6: (a) For the probability p=0.2 and p=0.6 (that a vehicle passing the source will also pass
the destination), the number of messages successfully received at the destination RSU after a given
number of retransmissions by the source RSU. (b) For different values of probability p, the number
of received messages at the destination after less than or equal to each given number of
retransmissions. (c) Number of Relay Vehicles (N) required to deliver the message to the destination
with a 95% confidence probability (Pc) and different values of probability (p)

We have considered two cases and compared the number of vehicles and time required to transfer a
message from a source of information (which can be a vehicle passing the scene of incident, or an
RSU) to a destination (which can be an emergency response vehicle or an RSU). In the first case, we
have a limited roadside infrastructure and messages are transferred between the source and the
destination via vehicles only. In the second case, we have intermediate standalone RSUs between the
source and the destination, which help in relaying the message. In this case the source is also a
standalone RSU. Simulations will help us ascertain the effectiveness of our proposed system in
relaying messages using vehicles with or without the intermediate standalone RSUs.
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We simulate a region of 25000m×6250m with a road network as shown in Figure 2.3. The number
of smart vehicles on the simulation field (a total road length of 35000m), at any one time, is kept to
5. This small number of vehicles is used to check the effectiveness of our proposed system during
the initial deployment stages of VANET. V2V communication is ignored due to this small number
of smart vehicles. At each junction, a vehicle can divert from its current direction of travel with a
probability of diversion Pd .

In both cases, the source RSU retransmits the message until it is received by the destination. In the
second case, a vehicle carrying a message relays it to any intermediate RSU that it encounters. The
number of retries (vehicles used to carry the information from the source) and the total time taken
for the information to reach the destination is recorded for each message. A total of 1000 messages
are transmitted in each simulation. The number of messages received at the destination after less
than or equal to each given number of retries for Pd =0.5 are shown in Figure 2.7(a). The results
indicate that the use of multiple (standalone intermediate) RSUs decreases the number of retries
considerably.

Figure 2.7(b) shows the number of relay vehicles used to transmit the message to the destination
with a 95% of confidence probability. The probability of diversion is varied from 0.1 to 0.9. The
results show that for the first case (without intermediate RSUs) the number of vehicles reaches its
minimum value when Pd=0.5. This is due to the road layout: at the first road junction a small value
of Pd is helpful, but at the second road junction a large value of Pd is more advantageous. The
number of vehicles required for the scenario with multiple RSUs almost remains constant. This
happens because the vehicles traveling on other roads also help in the successful delivery of
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messages. The same pattern of results is obtained in the transmission delay of messages as shown in
Figure 2.7(c). The results indicate a high performance gain when multiple (standalone intermediate)
RSUs are used, and the transmission delay will be much more stable than the case when only two
RSUs are used. This is true for both the message transmission delays and the number of relay
vehicles required for successful message transmission.
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Figure 2.7 (a) For probability of diversion Pd = 0.5 (that a vehicle passing road junction will divert
from its direction of travel), the number of received messages at the destination after less than or
equal to each given number of retransmissions by the source RSU. (b) Number of Relay Vehicles
used by the source RSU to deliver the message at the destination with a 95% probability of
confidence (Pc) for different probabilities (Pd). (c) Message transmission delay for different
probabilities (Pd).
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2.4

Discussions

The proposed system effectively meets the challenges highlighted earlier. Details are given below:
•

The proposed system provides an immediate solution to the problem existing during
VANET initial deployment stage (before a critical mass is achieved).

•

The proposed system maintains VANET function in scenarios where V2V
communication is not possible due to road layout or traffic conditions.

•

The proposed system is progressive. RSUs of varying degrees of functionality can be
integrated and later upgraded without the need to an overhaul of existing systems.

•

The proposed system is an economical.

•

The proposed system exhibits good scalability. More areas can easily be included in an
existing VANET network by simply adding more RSUs. In addition, initially isolated
regions can be later interconnected by RSU to RSU links.

•

The minimum number of RSUs required for the proposed system to work is very small
as compared to conventional solutions.

There are some limitations in the proposed design. First, because communication relies on RSUs to
relay, it may be slow for vehicles to receive time-critical messages compared with V2V (or V2I with
I2I) communication. However, in the VANET initial transition period, V2V and also I2I
communication might not be possible due to the low density of smart vehicles on the roads and a
lack of fully networked roadside units. Second, the VANET communication relies on the RSU
infrastructure. It is possible that in some rural areas there are no RSU devices installed. Third, RSU
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to RSU indirect communication relies on passing-by vehicles. Thus the communication may be slow
and can be interrupted frequently when there are few smart vehicles around.

2.5

Conclusion

There are numerous proposed applications of VANET but most of them are not practical until a
critical mass of fully networked roadside units and smart vehicles is achieved. It will be very difficult
to achieve this critical mass in the initial years of VANET deployment. This difficulty will further
slow down the market penetration. In this chapter, we have presented an economical and practicable
solution to address this issue, which incorporates and relies on a very limited numbers of roadside
units with very basic functionalities. Our solution is economical, scalable and upgradeable. We show
that the solution is practical with the help from a small number of smart vehicles. The future work
includes use of real traffic data for simulations and experiments
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CHAPTER 3

INTERNET ACCESS THROUGH SATELLITE
RECEIVE-ONLY TERMINALS

Communication and especially the connectivity to the Internet is the basic requirement of most
modern productive environments. We spend a considerable time traveling from one point to
another via vehicles; this time can be more productive if we are connected to the Internet. A lot of
research has been done to bring the Internet to vehicles. To this end, three main approaches have
been adopted: Internet through roadside infrastructure alone or through roadside infrastructure
using vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication [1 - 7], Internet through cellular network [1, 8, 9] and
Internet through satellite (symmetric/asymmetric) [10 - 14]. However, all three approaches have
some challenges to deal with.

The Internet access through roadside infrastructure requires pervasive roadside units (RSUs) to
achieve connectivity, since the typical radial range of an RSU is 250m so we need an RSU every 400
to 500m. Further, these RSUs must all be connected to the Internet. Also, the installation,
connection and maintenance of these RSUs will be quite expensive, and it may not be possible to
achieve the desired connectivity, especially during the initial days of VANET deployment and along
highways or in rural areas. This approach is based on vehicular network architecture defined by
IEEE standards, i.e., IEEE standards for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) [15 19]. The Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) of WAVE (IEEE P802.11p
[19]) are based on Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications
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defined by IEEE standard 802.11 [20]. Both vehicles and RSUs use same access technologies
specified by WAVE standards.

The Internet access through cellular networks, with the advent of 3G/4G technologies, provides
data rates comparable to broadband; however, these technologies are not uniformly available
throughout cellular coverage area, and hence, many users still get lower data rates. One of the design
considerations for the cellular networks (to minimize the infrastructure cost) is to use larger cells
where user density is low; this is especially the case along highways and in rural areas [21]. But in
case of vehicular networks the density is likely to increase and may require up-gradation of cellular
networks. In addition to these issues, when a vehicle crosses international boundary, the service
providers and their carrier frequencies will often change, which makes user equipment more
expensive and complex. Furthermore, this approach is also not compatible with the vehicular
network architecture defined by IEEE standards for WAVE [15 - 19]; cellular access technologies
are quite different from those specified by WAVE standards. This will make both VANET-spatialtransition (between areas with varying degree of VANET coverage) and VANET-temporaltransition (during later stages of VANET when previously not covered areas are also covered)
expensive and difficult.

The Internet access through symmetric satellite requires vehicles to be equipped with satellite
transceiver, which adds to the cost of user equipment. Satellite channel suffers heavily from losses;
these losses introduce errors in the communication and require some error correction mechanisms.
The losses can be atmospheric or due to shadowing. The atmospheric losses are generally
compensated by link margin but shadow losses generally make communication impossible. These
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shadow losses are much more pronounced in urban areas where the areas are congested with
buildings and other manmade objects. Therefore Internet access through satellite is particularly not
an economical solution for urban areas. Further, this approach is also not compatible with the
vehicular network architecture defined by IEEE standards for WAVE [15 - 19], and will make both
the spatial and temporal transitions difficult.

We present a solution that complements the existing ones and provides Internet connectivity during
the initial deployment phase of the vehicular networks and also in areas with very scarce roadside
infrastructure (such as along highways and in rural areas). The solution uses satellite receive-only
terminals and very few (widely spaced) RSUs. It can support TCP connection even when the uplink
is interrupted for long durations of time. We present a number of options with varying degrees of
error handling capabilities and recommend their usage according to the environment. The use of
RSUs makes our approach compatible to the vehicular network architecture defined by IEEE
standards for WAVE [15 - 19]. Later on when additional RSUs are installed, the solution will
improve its performance by making more use of RSUs and also by reduction of inter-RSU distance,
and hence, enabling a smooth transition to fully functional VANET defined by IEEE WAVE
standards [15 - 19]. Similarly, it will ease the handoff between areas of varying VANET coverage.
The solution is cost effective, incremental and practical.

A lot of research to address challenges of Internet (especially TCP performance) over delay tolerant
networks (DTN)/satellite networks has been carried out. In order to avoid the repetitions, we will,
not focus on lower level details of what particular Internet protocol to be used; rather, we will
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identify the desired characteristics of the protocol and any already defined protocol (or combinations
of these) can be used for the proposed solution.

The chapter is organized in six sections. Section 3.1 highlights the motivation and challenges related
to the research work. Section 3.2 discusses related research work in the field. Section 3.3 explains
important characteristics of satellite communication and mobile satellite communication model.
Section 3.4 discusses the proposed system design and its various options along with the
recommended usage. Section 3.5 describes the simulation scenarios and important results of the
simulation. And in the end, section 3.6 presents conclusion.

3.1

Motivation and Challenges

If we define the utilization of a roadside unit as the length of time it successfully communicates with
a particular vehicle (the utilization is directly proportional to the radial communication range of
roadside unit and inversely proportional to the speed of the vehicle), then the utility of roadside
units is much more in case of urban areas as compared to that in rural areas or along the highways.
This is because of their complementary traffic characteristics, i.e., the average vehicle speeds are
much lower in urban areas than that in rural areas or along highways, and also the ratio between
move and stop is more inclined towards stop in urban areas (because of frequent intersections, turns
and road signals) than that in rural areas or along highways.

This means the connectivity achieved with a given number of roadside units is much more in case of
urban areas than that of rural areas or along highways. Therefore, to achieve same degree of
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connectivity for a particular vehicle, we will need much more roadside units in rural areas (or along
highways) than that in urban areas. Further, the installation and maintenance of roadside units in
urban areas is much more economical than in rural areas. Also, the networking of roadside units to
Internet is also easy in case of urban areas, since urban areas already have pervasive Internet
connectivity. It is intuitive that the solutions completely based on roadside units are not practicable
in rural areas (or along highways) especially during the initial deployment stages of vehicular
network. Therefore, the extension of Internet to vehicular network in rural areas (or along highways)
and especially during the initial deployment stages is not a trivial task.

The movement of vehicles is not restricted within one region; it is normal for users to travel through
different urban/rural areas and along different highways on a single day. Any solution for rural area
must be compatible with that of urban area: the urban VANET will, most likely, be based on RSUs
as defined by WAVE standards. Therefore, the solution must support smooth spatial transition
(handoff) between these regions. Further, during later stages as more and more area will be covered
by RSUs, the solution should also support smooth temporal transition to mature VANET.

A number of digital video broadcasting (DVB) standards define interactive data services including
Internet access via satellite, public switched telecommunication network, wireless etc [22 - 26]. In
[23, 24], both the broadcast and interaction channels are via satellite which makes user equipment
costly and incompatible with VANET standards. Whereas, in [26] both channels are via wireless
(VHF/UHF bands) similar to VANET. DVB standards also support the combination of different
DVB interactive systems [22]. Satellite as broadcast/downlink channel coupled with dial-up as
interaction/return channel to provide Internet to home users especially in rural areas has been used
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successfully for quite some time [28 - 32]. Our solution uses satellite as broadcast/downlink channel
and terrestrial wireless (defined by VANET standards) as interaction/return channel.

The Internet and also some of the possible VANET applications exhibit asymmetric nature of
traffic, in this downlink traffic is many orders of magnitude as compared to the uplink traffic [27,
28]. This asymmetry is likely to increase with time as more and more content is becoming
multimedia in nature. We use asymmetric satellite communication (downlink only) to take advantage
of this asymmetry. The use of satellite to provide connectivity in rural areas also seems logical since
there will be less shadowing and hence low errors in rural areas (or along highways). The
interaction/uplink is via roadside infrastructure using vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communication
or V2V in conjunction with V2I communication. However, the limited number of RSUs makes the
traditional asymmetric satellite solutions impracticable. The challenge in VANET is the intermittent
availability of terrestrial interaction/return channel with possible long disruption periods especially
during the initial days of VANET deployment.

3.2

Related Work

The solutions presented so far for provision of Internet to vehicles can be broadly divided into three
categories; first, the solutions relying on roadside infrastructure or vehicle to vehicle communication,
second, the solutions relying in some way on cellular networks and third, the solutions making use
of satellite links. We will refer some of the important research papers in these categories.
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A number of researches such as FleetNet, Drive-thru Internet, etc extensively rely on road side
infrastructure and/or vehicle to vehicle communication to provide Internet connectivity to vehicles
[1 - 4, 6, 33]. The basic requirement for these solutions is availability of pervasive roadside
infrastructure and/or a large number of smart vehicles. Both these assumptions are not realistic
during the initial deployment stage, further use of vehicle to vehicle communication has many
security issues, such as privacy, confidentiality, denial of service etc. Solutions based on existing WiFi
networks face similar problems [7].

A number of researches have incorporated cellular networks in VANET [1, 8, 9, 34]. Cellular
networks are mostly used as a backbone - a replacement to roadside infrastructure. Cellular
networks, though pervasive, offer lower data rates as compared to Wi-Fi (roadside infrastructure).
Although with the advent of 3G/4G technologies data rates close to broadband can be achieved,
these technologies are not uniformly available throughout cellular coverage areas and many users are
still dependent on other heterogeneous technologies (WAP, GPRS, EDGE, HSDPA, etc [35]).
Further, cellular data plan subscriptions are expensive; an unconstrained plan with a 5GB/month
limit costs approximately $700/year. 5GB/month means per day a user on average can send/receive
50 emails (20 with attachments), download a song and a game/app, view 40 web pages, posts 10
social media posts with photos, and watch a streaming video of 40 minutes [36]. Although unlimited
data plans and those that cost tens of dollars are also available, but these plans have fine print
conditions, such as ‘usage patterns’ (no file sharing, excessive usage, etc), ‘can only be used on smart
phones’ (no tethering), ‘can only access certain service’ (email, predefined websites, etc), and ‘must
have a qualifying voice plan’. Some service providers are charging approximately $2/MB or 1¢/KB
for web browsing. All major cellular service providers are now offering and encouraging users (such
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as offering ‘unlimited Wi-Fi usage with data plan’) to access data through hotspots (which use Wi-Fi
just like VANET roadside infrastructure instead of 3G/4G). This also highlights cost/benefit of WiFi over 3G/4G. Cellular networks also have several other disadvantages such as expensive to
built/maintain, billing/licensing issues among different service providers, higher roaming rates, large
and variable latency, central switching/resource management, difficult to scale and occasional
blackouts [5, 6, 37-42].

Use of satellite channel for provision of Internet to terrestrial (static) and mobile users has been an
interesting topic of research. Most of the researches in this area are related to performance-studies
or enhancements of Internet protocols over symmetric/asymmetric satellite channels with stationary
nodes [28 – 32, 43 - 47]. Symmetric satellite communication does not take advantage of asymmetric
nature of Internet traffic and is more expensive. Further, we are dealing with asymmetric satellite
communication where the nodes are mobile.

There are also quite a few researches dealing with the mobile nodes but most of these study Internet
protocol performance/enhancements [10 - 14]. Further these consider symmetric satellite channel
i.e., both uplink and downlink communication takes place via satellite. Symmetric communication
requires expensive transceiver at the mobile nodes and it does not take advantage of the asymmetric
nature of Internet communication. Whereas, we are using satellite downlink communication only
and the nodes are mobile nodes.

Our work comes closer to [48], where asymmetric satellite communication has been used for
provision of Internet to the mobile nodes. In [48] the satellite is only used for downlink and uplink
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is via cellular network. The system design requires the mobile node to be equipped with both the
satellite and cellular interfaces. The design suffers from the disadvantages of using cellular network
(described earlier). Also, the design does not incorporate any roadside infrastructure, which when
available could provide much higher data rates at lower costs. Further this also implies that the
design will not be very successful in urban areas since satellite communication is not very reliable in
urban areas (connection/fade ratio can be 33.3/66.6 in higher density cities like New York [49]).

Our system design differs in a number of ways from the researches presented above. First, we use
satellite communication for downlink only thus reducing complexity of user terminals and operating
costs. We use roadside infrastructure for uplink communication and do not need any cellular
transceivers or satellite transmitters at nodes. This eases compatibility with other vehicular network
architectures. The design works with very small number of RSUs and is especially suited for initial
deployment stages. We present a number of options with varying degrees of error handling
capabilities and recommend their suitability for different environments.

3.3

3.3.1

Satellite Channel

Channel Characteristics

The satellite channel is characterized by long delays, high fading/attenuation to signal, high
bandwidth and in-order packet delivery. As the signal travels from satellite to an earth station (or a
mobile node as in this case) it undergoes a variety of impairments or losses. Some of these losses are
constant, others can be calculated based on statistical data and some are dependent on weather
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conditions [50]. A satellite system design takes care of all clear weather losses by including
appropriate margins for these losses. It can be safely assumed that the existing satellite link takes
care of all such losses, the only losses that need to considered are atmospheric attenuation (mainly
due to rain, ice etc) and mobile channel losses (multipath fading and signal shadowing).

The multipath fading is caused because, the received signal in addition to direct signal also contains
components which are reflected off different surrounding objects. These reflected or echo
components mainly depend on the environment such as rural, urban or suburban. The fading can be
short term usually caused by reflections over surrounding surfaces or long term caused by hills,
buildings, trees etc [51]. The Shadowing occurs when the direct satellite signal is obstructed; main
causes of shadowing can be buildings, trees, bridges etc. The shadowing also depends on the
environment of the user. In case of geostationary satellites the shadowing and multipath fading is
mostly determined by the user’s mobility characteristics, the environment and satellite elevation
angle [52]. So to summarize it can be said that the mobile channel losses are closely related to the
environment of the user.

3.3.2

Channel Model

The effects of satellite communication on Internet and especially TCP have long been an area of
Interest to researchers. For this different satellite channel models have been assumed/used. The
simplest of these assumes satellite channel as an error-free/error-resilient channel and just studies
the effects of delays, bandwidth and asymmetry [31, 47]. An extension to this model is to assume
some fixed values of bit error rates (BER) and study the effects on protocols [46]. Another model is
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based on additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) satellite channel [43, 45]. All these models
consider the receiver to be static, but in our case the node will be mobile and therefore the channel
behavior will change with time. The most commonly used land mobile satellite channel (LMSC)
model is a two-state Markov chain based channel model, which has been represented by a digital
two-state Gilbert-Elliott model [52, 53]. We will also be using this two-state channel model.

It is a two-state ON/OFF model. In ON (1) state the communication is error free after applying
existing satellite communication channel coding; the state mainly covers line of sight (LOS) region.
In OFF (0) state communication errors are beyond the existing channel correction capability and
reliable communication is not possible, the state mainly covers non line of sight
(NLOS)/shadowed/deep-fade regions [12, 53, 54]. Figure 3.1 shows the two-state model [52].
Transition probabilities of this model depend on the environment (mean duration of ON/OFF
state), vehicle speed and transmission (bit) rate [54]. The model excludes fading events with short
durations, so the state transitions can be assumed to take place at cell boundaries, where a cell
corresponds to a data segment.

p10

p11

ON (1)

OFF (0)

p00

p01

Figure 3.1: Two-state ON/OFF Land Mobile Satellite Channel (LMSC) Model
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Denote pxy as the transition probability of going from state x to state y, one-step state transition
matrix is given by Equation 3.1. Denote πx as the steady state probability of state x, the two steady
state probabilities are given by Equation 3.2.
p
P   00
 p10

1 

p01 

p11 

(3.1)

p10
p01 ,
0 
p01  p10
p 01  p10

(3.2)

Denote Dx as the mean sojourn duration of state x, for a constant transmission-rate/average-nodespeed in a particular environment the two transition probabilities are given by Equation 3.3. Denote
px(>n) as the probability that a state x lasts for longer than n duration units, px(>n) for two states are
given by Equation 3.4.
p10 

1 ,
1
p01 
D1
D0

(3.3)

n
, p1 ( n)  p11n
p0 ( n)  p00

(3.4)

also p00  1  p01 , p11  1  p10

(3.5)

The average time in each state mainly depends on the environment in which the vehicle/node is
moving, Table 3.1 shows the different environments, average vehicle speeds in these environments
and average bad/good state times for these environments (the values of the Table 3.1 are from [54]),
for more detailed explanation and data refer to [52]. (Table 3.2 summarizes various probabilities of
the model).
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Table 3.1 Average time in ON and OFF states for different environments
Vehicle Speed
State ON (1)
Duration – D1
State OFF (0)
Duration – D0

Urban Suburban
Below
Below
50Km/hr 50Km/hr
22s
8s
15s

2s

Rural
Below 6070 Km/hr
16s

Highway
Below
120Km/hr
18s

4s

2s

Table 3.2 Probabilities associated to LMSC Model
Transition Probability from
state x to state y
Steady state probability of
state x
Probability that a state x lasts
for longer than n duration
units

3.3.3

pxy

p11, p00, p01, p10

πx

π1, π0

px(>n) p1(>n), p0(>n)

Satellite Communication

The satellite downlink communication makes use of existing error correction techniques on each
transmitted segment. It is assumed that the existing error correction techniques applied are sufficient
to provide error free communication in the absence of deep fading and shadowing [12, 53, 54]. To
further reduce the effects of segment loss due to deep fading and shadowing, time diversity is
applied [13, 55]. It can be achieved by inter-user or intra-user segment interleaving or both (Figure
3.2). This helps in spreading the error among different users or different sessions, and by employing
error correction techniques at higher layer (discussed later) the chances of recovery are improved.
The interleaving removes the impact of consecutive losses and therefore we can assume that
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consecutive data segments of a session/user are independent of each other. This assumption
simplifies our analysis of segment losses under different architectures that we propose next. In rest
of the chapter (especially in figures) the segments considered/shown adjacent to each other are
consecutive segments of a session and are not necessarily transmitted consecutively unless
described/shown otherwise.

User - U1
Session – A

Segment -S1

S2

S3

S4

… … … Sn

Session – B

Segment -S1

S2

S3

S4

… … … Sn

|

|

Segment -S1

S2

S3

S4

… … … Sn

Session – A

Segment -S1

S2

S3

S4

… … … Sn

Session – B

Segment -S1

S2

S3

S4

… … … Sn

|

|

S2

S3

|
Session – N

|

|

User - U2

|
Session – N

Segment -S1

|
S4

|
… … … Sn

Consecutive segments of one User
(U1, A, S1)

(U1, A, S2) … (U1, A, Sn) (U1, B, S1) … (U1, B, Sn) … (U1, B, Sn)

Actual segment transmission sequence in time
t

(U1, A, S1) (U2, A, S1) … (Un, A, S1) (U1, A, S2)

… (Un, A, Sn) … (Un, N, Sn)

Where (Ua, X, Sc) is segment # ‘c’ of session # X for user 'a’

Figure 3.2: Inter and Intra user segment interleaving to achieve time diversity

Independence Analysis: We can provide mathematical formula to show the degree of dependency
between two consecutive segments of one session’s transmission after using the above segment
interleaving method. The objective of interleaving method is to disperse a session’s segments such
that one satellite error will not cause consecutive losses for a single session. In term of the satellite
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channel Markov on/off model, it means, we need to disperse two consecutive segments of a session
such that their Markov states are independent.

Denote d as the number of Markov state transitions between the transmissions of two consecutive
segments of a session. The Markov model d-step state transition matrix P(d) is:
 pd
P ( d )  P d   00
d
 p10

d

p01
d 
p11 

(3.6)

where pijd is the d-step transition probability from state i to state j.

d
From the steady state analysis, we know that as the value of d increases, p00
and p10d will gradually
d
converge to  0 , and p01
and p11d will converge to  1 . Therefore, we can define the degree of

dependency after d-step state transition as:
2

d
d
d
 p d  p10
  p01

 p11
  

Pdependent   00
 0
  1 

2

(3.7)

The interleaving method requires that the degree of dependency between two consecutive segments
of a session is smaller than a predefined parameter δ, i.e., Pdependent<δ. To achieve this, we can adjust
the interleaving parameter, d, to satisfy this requirement.
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Because the d-step transition probabilities in Equation 3.7 do not have closed form solutions, to find
the suitable value of d, we could try d=1, d=2, … to derive the corresponding values of Pdependent , until
the requirement Pdependent<δ is satisfied.

3.4

Proposed Architecture

Our focus is on provision/extension of Internet to vehicular networks in rural areas and along the
highways especially during the initial deployment stages. The working environment is characterized
by a very small number of RSUs that are widely interspaced. These RSUs may be co-located with
isolated populated areas along the highways and are connected to the Internet. The environment
does not exhibit high shadow losses.

3.4.1

Assumptions

Our system design is based on a few simple assumptions. First, vehicles are equipped with GPS, can
record their location at precise time and can provide direction of travel information to the RSU.
Second, vehicles can receive the satellite broadcast. And third, RSUs have the digital map of the area
and are aware of the locations of adjacent RSUs.

3.4.2

Basic Idea

A vehicle connects to a nearby RSU and requests some Internet data. The request will include
location, speed and direction of travel of the vehicle. This information will help an RSU to calculate
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possible connection time left and possible next RSU. If sufficient connection time is left then the
request may be serviced through the same RSU. When the vehicle exits the coverage of current
RSU, further responses to the vehicle’s earlier request will be sent to the next RSU in the direction
of travel. If two RSUs are located at a reasonable distance, which is likely in urban environment, the
next RSU will continue to deliver the content to the vehicle when the vehicle comes within its
coverage area (RSU-based region in Figure 3.3). If the next RSU is not within a reasonable distance
(especially in rural environment where the RSUs will be widely spaced) then satellite downlink
channel will be used for delivery of content (satellite downlink-only region in Figure 3.3). We will

DOWNLINK

SATELLITE
SATELLITE
GATEWAY
GATEWAY

INTERNET
SERVER
SERVER

PROXY
PROXY

Wireless

VANET

Wired

INTERNET

Satellite Network

mostly address the satellite downlink option in this chapter.

Satellite downlink-only region

RSU-based region

Figure 3.3: Proposed design in context of higher level vehicular network architecture
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While a vehicle travels between two RSUs in the satellite downlink-only region, it cannot send
acknowledgements. In order to keep TCP connection alive and avoid unnecessary retransmissions,
adaptive TCP timeout and delayed ACK will be used [56, 57]. TCP timeouts will be calculated/
predicted depending on the location of the next RSU and will be used accordingly. The downlink
has large delays so in order to avoid unnecessary retransmissions selective acknowledgement will be
used. Modified TCP is only employed between the proxy and mobile host so no modifications are
required in protocols running on existing Internet. The use of UDP is much simpler than TCP and
will not require any modifications. The protocol stacks are shown in Figure 3.4.

TCP

TCP

IP

IP

TCP

TCP

(Modified)

(Modified)

IP

IP
VANET
(WIRED)

INTERNET

PROXY

SERVER

VANET
(WIRELESS)

MOBILE NODE

ROADSIDE
UNIT

(a)
TCP

TCP

IP

IP

TCP
(Modified)

IP

IP
VANET
(WIRED)

INTERNET

SERVER

TCP
(Modified)

SATELLITE
(WIRELESS)

SATELLITE
GATEWAY

PROXY

MOBILE NODE

(b)
Figure 3.4: Protocol stacks for different regions. (a) Content transfer to mobile node via Road side
units. (b) Content transfer to mobile node via satellite.
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The flow of traffic between different entities is outlined below (refer to Figure 3.3):


The mobile node authenticates with the proxy through an RSU and is issued with an IP
address; this IP address will uniquely identify the mobile node as long as it remains within
the boundary of the proxy.



The mobile node sends a request to the RSU.



The RSU forwards the request to the proxy.



The proxy establishes a connection to Server on behalf of the mobile node and gets/caches
all the content (based on initial request of the mobile node).



The proxy establishes a connection with the mobile node on behalf of Server and sends the
content via an RSU.



When the mobile node moves out of the range of an RSU and the direct connection with
RSU times out (Figure 3.3, satellite downlink-only region); the RSU informs the proxy about
expected time of next ACK from the mobile node. The time period depends on speed of the
vehicle and location of the next RSU along the travel direction of the mobile node.



The proxy starts sending further content via satellite. It keeps on sending without waiting for
ACK from the node till the time period expires.



The mobile node keeps on receiving data via satellite till it reaches the next RSU (Figure 3.3,
end of satellite downlink-only region).



The mobile node sends ACK for the received data or NACK for segments lost due to
errors.



The proxy updates the mobile node’s new position and acts according to ACK/NACK.



The process is repeated till all the requested content is delivered to the mobile node.
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3.4.3

Options

Four different options have been defined for transmission of data from satellite to vehicles: Baseline,
Repeated Transmission, Forward Error Correction, and Error Location Prediction and Avoidance.
These options have different levels of error handling capabilities with corresponding overheads and
delays. A comparison between these options is given in Table 3.3.

3.4.3.1

Baseline

A vehicle sends a request to its nearby RSU (Figure 3.5, R1), which in turn forwards the request to
the proxy server. The proxy server gets the response/data from the server and forwards it to the
satellite gateway. The proxy server splits the end-to-end connection between the vehicle and server
[58]. It maintains two separate connections, one with the server on behalf of the vehicle and the
other with the vehicle. The session with vehicle will be asymmetric, that is, the down link will be
through satellite and return will be through RSUs. No modifications are required on the server side
or on the satellite downlink.

The connection between the proxy and the vehicle will employ TCP enhancements/modifications
such as Adaptive timeout, delayed ACK, and selective ACK/NAK [56, 57]. The adaptive timeout
caters for the time during which the vehicle cannot send ACKs, that is while traveling between the
RSUs (Figure 3.5, between R1 and R2).
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When a request is received by the proxy, it forwards the request to the original server in a separate
connection. It also calculates the timeouts and delays (for delayed ACK) expected based on the
distance between adjacent RSUs (Figure 3.5, between R1 and R2), the vehicle speed and its direction
of travel. The proxy server receives all the data, which maybe a large file, from the server and also
keeps the connection alive for further requests from the vehicle (this will be necessary if the
transaction has to be completed after receiving some response from the vehicle during its
connection with the next RSU). The proxy server then forwards the data to the vehicle through the
satellite gateway and waits for the ACK/NAK. Because of high bandwidth-delay product (the delay
of the satellite communication and also between sending the data and receiving ACK due to
separation of RSUs), it may be necessary that all data segments are sent before waiting for an
ACK/NAK from the vehicle.

DOWNLINK
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Error
Zone 1

Error
Zone 2

NAK (4, 5,
13, 14, 15)

R2

Figure 3.5: Baseline architecture, delivery of content takes place through satellite while the mobile
node is traveling between R1 and R2. The mobile node sends NAK for the lost segments when
reaching R2, where R2 takes charge and resends these lost segments to the mobile node.
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If some of the received frames have been lost (Figure 3.5, segments 4, 5, 13, 14 and 15) then the
vehicle sends selective ACK/NAK on its next contact with roadside infrastructure (Figure 3.5, R2).
These ACK/NAK segments are forwarded to the proxy server, which retransmits the lost segments
through satellite/RSU.

Analysis: If the transmission consists of N chunks of data segments and each chunk is transmitted
independently, the probability p that a chunk is transmitted during Good state is:
p

1
p01

1   0 p01  p10

(3.8)

The probability that all N chunks of data segments are successfully transmitted, before reaching the
next RSU, is given by:
Psuccess  p N

(3.9)

3.4.3.2 Repeated Transmissions

A method to address segment losses is by repeating the complete transmission in cyclic manner for
a fixed number of times. This option adds maximum data redundancy. Although this is not an
efficient utilization of the bandwidth available and we will have low information per bit transmitted,
this approach can mitigate the effects of channel impairments. Especially during the initial VANET
deployment stages when not many of smart vehicles will be on roads, a given satellite channel will be
shared by a limited number of vehicles and each vehicle will have sufficient share of satellite
bandwidth, which can be used for repeated transmissions. Also, during the initial stages there will be

63

fewer numbers of RSUs which means larger distances between RSUs and more time to service a
given request. This available time can be utilized for the redundancy.

This scheme suffers from long delays because in worst case a vehicle might have to wait for a
complete cycle of retransmission to recover the lost data segment. It has high delay but is a suitable
scheme when we are experiencing high error rate that cannot be corrected by other schemes such as
Forward Error Correction (FEC).

Figure 3.6 shows a vehicle driving between two widely spaced RSUs. The data is being sent through
satellite which comprises of segments numbered 1 to 8. The vehicle fails to receive segments 4 and 5
during the first transmission cycle since it was passing through error zone 1 during their
transmissions. The vehicle recovers the lost segments from the second transmission cycle and is
successful in receiving all eight segments before reaching the next RSU, where it acknowledges the
receipt of all the segments.

Analysis of the number of transmissions: We present the mathematical formula to derive the number of
transmissions required in order to achieve a desired transmission success rate. This analysis is
possible because the segments of one session are transmitted independent with each other as
introduced earlier.
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Figure 3.6: Repeated transmission, whole data set is repeated several times. Data segment(s) lost can
be recovered from later repeated transmissions.

Assume that a session transmission requires N chunks of data segments. Because each chunk is
transmitted independently, it is transmitted during the satellite Good signal status with the
probability p as defined in Equation 3.8).

Denote the system transmission success probability when it implements n repeated transmissions as
Psuccess(n). The session transmission is treated as successful if the recipient receives all N chunks of data
without error before reaching the next RSU. Thus we can derive Equation 3.10. If the desired
transmission success rate is required to be Pr, we need to choose the number of transmissions n such
that Psuccess(n)>Pr . Psuccess(n) for n = 2, 3 and different values of N are shown in Figure 3.9(a).
Psuccess(n) =[1-(1-p)n]N

(3.10)
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3.4.3.3 Forward Error Correction (FEC)

When deep fades happen, complete segments may be lost so link layer error correction mechanism
implemented by satellite downlink cannot recover all lost data. For such a situation, FEC and
interleaving at higher layers such as transport layer may be used to address the issue of long burst
errors. Two possible schemes can be adopted, FEC at session level and FEC at segment/packet
level [51]. Both have their advantages and disadvantages.

At segment level, a fixed number of data segments are grouped together and parity segments are
added based on the selected FEC algorithm. The success depends on the number of segments lost.
In case of erasure codes the lost data can be recovered as long as the number of lost segments is no
more than the number of parity segments added [59].

At the session level, the session is first divided into fixed sized blocks and then parity blocks are
added to it. Since all sessions are not of equal size, FEC codes that operate on a fixed number of
blocks cannot be employed here. Different sessions can be further interleaved to further spread each
individual session in time and avoid the damages of long burst of errors.

The segments for different users, vehicles in this case, can be further interleaved or multiplexed.
This provides another layer of spreading in time and the number of segments lost of a particular
node or of a particular session will be further reduced by a factor defined by the number of nodes.
This makes error correction mechanism more robust to deep fades and shadow. It may be possible
to limit the number of lost segments per session within the tolerance of FEC employed. If the
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number of segments lost is more than the tolerance then the lost segments may be requested again
at the next RSU through NAK mechanisms explained earlier. It is important to note that
retransmission of all lost segments may not be necessary in this case since we only need to bring the
number of lost segments within the tolerance range of FEC employed.

Analysis: If the session/file consists of N data segments and α rate erasure codes are used, αN
segments will be added to the transmission and can therefore handle up to αN segment losses. The
success probability, before reaching the next RSU, can be given as Equation 3.11 which means we
can derive Equation 3.12. Psuccess for α = 0.10, 0.20 and different values of N are shown in Figure
3.9(b).
Psuccess = prob (≤ αN segments are bad)

(3.11)

N (1   ) N


(1  p)i p(1 ) N  i
Psuccess   
i
i 0 


(3.12)

3.4.3.4 Error Location Prediction and Avoidance

The satellite mobile channel suffers mostly from shadowing and fading. These errors are strongly
correlated to the environment. Vehicles traveling along a particular highway are expected to
experience channel impairments at approximately the same locations (referred as “error zones”). If
the location of these error zones can be registered and the segments that were sent to a vehicle while
it was passing through these error zones can be determined, then these segments may be
retransmitted to the vehicle without waiting for an ACK/NAK from the vehicle. This will improve
the performance since the vehicle does not need to wait for the next RSU, which may be quite far
off, to recover from the error.
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The location of error zones can be determined if a vehicle also includes location information with
NAK, which is the location where segment loss was experienced. This location information is used
to predict the possible location of segment losses for future vehicles traveling along the same path.
For example in Figure 3.5 the vehicle experiences loss of segments 4 and 5 in error zone 1 and can
report {NAK (4,5), Error Zone 1} to RSU-R2. (Also loss of segments 13, 14 and 15 in error zone 2
can be reported as {NAK (13,14,15), Error Zone 2}).

The error locations reported by different vehicles may have some variations; these variations may be
due to a slight shift in error location, imperfections in recording error location, or imperfection in
knowing packet loss locations. The effects of this variation among different error zone locations can
be minimized by using a smoothed error location (similar to TCP RTT model [60]). If α is the
smoothing factor (that determines the weightage of old value) and ε is the latest reported error
location, the smoothed error location E can be defined by Equation 3.13. The error zone span Z can
be taken as Z= C V centered at E, where V is the bad-state/error-zone variance and C is a constant.
E=αE +(1-α)ε

(3.13)

The time period during which the vehicle was traveling through a registered error zone can be
estimated from the vehicle’s speed and its initial time-location information. The fact that the speed
of vehicles has generally less variations in highway environment also helps in minimizing the
estimation error. However, an error margin can be added on both sides of probable error location to
cater for variations in driving speeds. The RSU with which the vehicle was last
authenticated/associated (Figure 3.7, R1) listens for the segments which were sent during the error
zone period and sends NAK to the proxy for retransmission of these segments.
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Take Figure 3.7 as an example. A vehicle sends a request to RSU R1, which forwards the request to
the proxy server and data is sent to the vehicle via satellite. The RSU R1 calculates approximate times
({t0-t1} and {t2-t3}) when the vehicle will be passing through error zones. It then monitors the
satellite transmissions destined to this vehicle. It records the segment numbers sent by satellite when
the vehicle passes through these error zones (segments {4, 5}, {11, 12, 13}) and sends NAK to the
proxy server for these segments (segments NAK {4, 5}, NAK {11, 12, 13}). When receiving these
NAKs, The proxy server retransmits the lost segments through satellite.

When the vehicle reaches the next RSU, it sends NAK if it still could not receive all the segments.
These NAK locations are then used by previous RSU to modify its error zone information. It is
important to note that there is no way for the initial RSU to know if an earlier reported error zone
has disappeared or not. There may be a situation (e.g. heavy rain) when most of the locations are
marked as error zones. To address this possible situation it is necessary, from time to time, to reset
the error zones to zero.

DOWNLINK
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t1

t2

t3

t
t1: NAK (4, 5) 1
t3: NAK (11, 12, 13)

R1

2

3

4

5

6

4

5

7

8

9

Error
Zone 1

10 11 12 13 14 11 12 13 15

Error
Zone 2

ACK (15)

R2

Figure 3.7: Error location prediction and avoidance. The system predicts the segments which may
have been lost on the bases of previous data and proactively retransmits these segments.
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Analysis: If a session consists of N data segments and the segments transmitted during Bad states
that are successfully predicted (assume pd is the probability for successful error zone prediction) are
retransmitted during a future Good state. Then the probability that all N segments are successfully
transmitted, before reaching the next RSU, is given by Equation 3.14. Psuccess for pd = 0.07, 0.08, 0.09
and different values of N are given in Figure 3.9(c).
Psuccess =[ p /(1- pd (1- p) ]N

3.4.4

(3.14)

Enhancements Using V2V Communication

V2V communication can be used in a variety of ways to further enhance the efficiency of above
mentioned techniques.

3.4.4.1

Local Error Recovery

If same satellite channel is used by a number of vehicles in a region in time sharing basis then it is
possible for vehicles to cache the data destined for other vehicles. The amount of data cached and
how long it is cached is function of available storage space. A cyclic buffer may be used for this
purpose; the oldest data is overwritten when it becomes full. Fast indexing can be done using hash
tables. This way when a vehicle exits error zone, it can sent NAK to next coming vehicle which may
be able to transmit the requested packet from its cache (Figure 3.8a, 3.8b, 3.8c).
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Figure 3.8: Enhancements using V2V communication. (a) packets {1,2,3,4} are lost by V1 since
traveling through error zone. (b) V1 send NAK{1,2,3,4} to V2. (c) V2 sends the cached packets
{1,2,3,4} to V1. (d) NAK{1,2,3,4} of V1 are relayed to R1 by V2, and the packets{1,2,3,4} are
retransmitted via satellite. (e) Packets {1,2,3,4} are being relayed to V1 by R2 via V3. Local Error
Recovery: (a)→(b)→(c), NAK/ACK Relay: (a)→(b)→(d), Retransmission Relay: (a)→(b)→(d)→(e)

3.4.4.2 NAK/ACK Relay

Another possible use is to relay NAK to previous RSU using vehicles traveling in opposite direction.
This way the lost packet can be retransmitted via satellite and the vehicle does not have to wait till it
reaches next RSU to report lost packets (Figure 3.8a, 3.8b, 3.8d). Further extension of this approach
could be to use V2V communication as reverse channel to send all the selective ACKs and NAKs.
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3.4.4.3 Retransmission Relay

The retransmission of lost packets may also be carried out by next RSU via vehicles traveling in
opposite direction (Figure 3.8a, 3.8b, 3.8d, 3.8e). In this case the security of spoofed
acknowledgements has to be ensured.

3.4.5

Comparison of Options

The options presented in preceding sections offer different levels of error tolerance at the cost of
overheads and delays. One must balance the performance (error tolerance) vs. cost (overheads and
delays) in selecting a particular solution; also, some options may be more suited to a particular
environment than the other environments. The baseline architecture uses simple ACK/NAK for
flow control and error correction. This scheme has no overhead but successful completion of
communication may be delayed till the vehicle reaches the next RSU. This architecture is suitable
where RSUs are not very widely dispersed. Error location prediction and avoidance uses proactive
retransmission of predicted lost segments. This scheme has low overheads and low delays. This
scheme is especially useful where satellite mobile channel losses are reasonably localized in certain
areas. Forward error correction based architecture has low delays at the cost of medium overheads.
It is suitable where errors are randomly distributed and Bad state durations are within the FEC
tolerances. Repeated Transmission is the most robust scheme, it is especially useful where longer
durations of Bad state is experienced, but at the cost of having high overhead and medium delays.
Figure 3.9(d) compares the success probabilities of different architectures. Note that the error
location prediction (pd=0.9) performs almost the same as repeated transmission (n=2). A summary
of the options with recommended usage is also presented in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3 Recommended usage of different options
Option
Baseline
Repeated
Transmission
Forward Error
Correction
Error Location
Prediction and
Avoidance

Overhead

Delay

None

High

High

Medium

Medium

Low

Low

Low

3.5

Recommended Usage
Where RSUs are not very widely
spaced
Where Bad state duration is
longer than FEC tolerance
Where Bad state duration is
within FEC tolerance
Where Bad state environments
are relatively stable over a
relatively long period of time

Evaluation

Simulations were carried out to ascertain the correctness of our analysis and to compare the
performances of various presented architectural options. It is assumed that the node/vehicle has
already requested the file/content via an RSU and is now travelling through the “satellite downlinkonly region” where, the requested file/content is being sent via satellite downlink (refer to Figure
3.3). We mainly address the satellite downlink part, and hence, the simulations were also restricted to
“Satellite downlink-only region”. The satellite downlink has been modeled according to the land
mobile satellite channel (LMSC) model presented in section 3.3. The environment is Highway with
parameters defined in Table 3.1. The simulated LMSC characteristic probabilities are shown in
Figure 3.10, which closely match the ones defined by Equation 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. 100 sets of Markov
chains were generated with equal distribution of initial/starting state. Each Markov chain had a
length of 2x106. For simulation first 5x105 states were skipped to offset the effect of initial/starting
state of a particular Markov chain.
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Figure 3.9: Analytical success probabilities (a) Repeated transmission (n = 2, 3) (b) Forward error
correction (α = 0.1, 0.2) (c) Error location prediction and avoidance (pd = 0.07, 0.08, 0.09) (d)
Comparison between baseline, repeated transmission, forward error correction and error location
prediction & avoidance architectures.

The file size is defined in terms of segments and varies from 10 to 50. It is assumed that one
segment is sent during one Markov state, each state being of 1ms. A segment sent during a Good
state is received error free while a segment sent during a Bad state is lost. The time between two
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consecutive segments of a particular node/vehicle follows Poisson distribution with parameter λ.
100,000 simulation runs were carried out for each file; every 1000 simulation runs used one
generated satellite channel Markov chain model. The simulation results compared with the
corresponding analytical results are shown in Figure 3.11. This figure confirms the correctness of
analysis presented earlier. The performance of Error location prediction and avoidance at Pd=0.9 is
comparable to Repeated transmission but with a much lower overhead. The transmission time and
segment loss probabilities for different architectures are shown in Figure 3.12; (a) gives the
probability that the segments lost (measured as a fraction of total file size) is less than or equal to a
given value and (b) gives the probability that the file transfer time (normalized with the mean
transfer time of baseline architecture) is less than or equal to a given value. The results clearly show
the superiority of Error location prediction option over Repeated transmission and also confirm the
characteristic descriptions of different architectural options presented in Table 3.3.

3.6

Conclusion

We have presented a viable solution for provision of the Internet access to the vehicular networks,
especially during the initial deployment phase of vehicular networks and also in areas with very
scarce roadside infrastructure (such as along highways and in rural areas). The solution is practical
and economical since it only uses satellite receive-only terminals and very few (widely spaced) RSUs.
We have also presented a number of error handling options which can be employed according to the
operating environments. We have compared these options with mathematical analysis and
simulation; both the comparisons agree with each other.
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The efficiency of the solution can be further enhanced by using V2V communication in a variety of
ways. For example, caching and later relaying the data for other vehicles (that might not have been
able to receive it due to error zone), relaying NAK to previous RSU (via vehicles traveling in
opposite direction), using V2V communication as the reverse channel to send all the selective ACKs
and NAKs, etc.

The solution is best suited for request-response type of applications, where a small request is
followed by a large response data (such as file transfer, multimedia download, etc). The solution
does not provide continuous connectivity so interactive or continuous connectivity demanding
applications, such as IP telephony cannot be supported. Also, the solution is not intended to
support security based applications that are time critical and require large data flow from vehicles;
however, non-time critical or broadcast nature of security applications are supported, for example,
dissemination of certificate revocation lists, weather, local news, hazard conditions, or other security
alerts through satellites.
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Figure 3.10: Simulated LMSC characteristics probabilities (a) Probability that number of consecutive
good state is more than given number of states (b) Probability that number of consecutive bad state
is more than given number of states.
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Figure 3.11: Comparison of simulated and analytical success probabilities (a) BaseLine and Repeated
transmission (n = 2) (b) Forward error correction (α = 0.1, 0.2) (c) Error location prediction and
avoidance (pd = 0.07, 0.08, 0.09) (d) Comparison between simulated results of baseline, repeated
transmission, forward error correction and error location prediction & avoidance architectures.
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CHAPTER 4

SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The desired security attributes for VANET include authentication, confidentiality, integrity, nonrepudiation, revocation and privacy. It is important to note that privacy is the most important
attribute, but at the same time it is in conflict with other attributes thus complicating the design of
VANET security architecture.

The simplest security architecture is to assign a single permanent certificate to each vehicle, this
ensures authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, revocation but not the privacy. To
address privacy, basic architecture can be extended to use multiple temporary certificates (normally
referred as pseudonyms) instead of one permanent certificate; this ensures privacy since pseudonyms
cannot be linked with each other and to the user [1-6]. Different schemes for pseudonymmanagement have been proposed to ensure unlink-ability. One such scheme is to issue pseudonyms
in bulk to vehicles [1]; the vehicle can then use these to ensure privacy. The bulk pseudonyms based
scheme requires a tamper-proof-device (TPD) to store the pseudonyms and perform cryptographic
operations [1], since these pseudonyms may be used for malicious purposes such as Sybil attacks.
The TPDs are expensive and need reloading with new pseudonyms when old ones expire or are
used up.
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Possible solutions can be to let vehicles generate pseudonyms themselves [2, 3] or periodically get
new pseudonyms from some certificate servers [4, 5]; thus eliminating the need of TPD (given the
pseudonyms/other-authenticating-credentials with overlapping validity are not generated in bulk).
First option makes revocation very complex and difficult while second option makes privacy
difficult to achieve (since certificate server can link various pseudonyms). Blind signature scheme [7],
with some kind of link-ability, is usually employed to address privacy issues of second option [4, 5].
The process requires multiple-certificate-servers/multiple-transactions for one signature (i.e., for
getting one pseudonym) and is thus difficult to realize, especially with an intermittent
communication link with the infrastructure. Blind signature scheme is also used in [6], but the
solution requires generation of authenticating-tokens in bulk thus needing TPD.

Other architectures include those based on principles of group signatures and ID cryptography [8].
In case of group signatures, vehicles form part of a group with a trusted group manager. The
architecture requires members to trust the group manager (who can find the true identity of signer),
which will be difficult to achieve in a dynamic VANET. Further, size, membership revocation and
dynamic membership (new nodes entering a group and old nodes leaving the group) increase the
complexity and overheads of this method.

The centralized certificate authority (CA) based solutions present a number of challenges which may
be difficult to address during the initial deployment stages of VANET. The CAs must be organized
in a hierarchical manner for effective management. The hierarchy can be area/location based; a
given area (e.g., United States or Europe) can be divided into regions (e.g., states or countries) with
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each region having its regional CA, these regional CAs are then linked with each other via a top level
CA. Figure 4.1 shows a hierarchy with two regions.

Central Certification Authority - CA

CA (Region 2) – CA2

CA (Region 1) – CA1

CA2(CV2)

CA1(CV1)

V1

V2

Figure 4.1: A certification authority hierarchy with two regional CAs. CA (Region 1) issues
certificates to vehicles registered with in its region, for example certificate CV1 is issued to vehicle
V1. (Note: CAx(CVy) is a certificate issued to vehicle y by a CA of region x.)

The hierarchy can be extended both upwards and downwards. This means for vehicles to easily
travel outside their CA’s domain, we need to establish a trust relationship among all certification
authorities; thus certificate verification may take longer if the trust relationship goes through a long
chain. Figure 4.2 shows possible steps taken for certificate verification when a vehicle from one
region tries to communicate with a vehicle from another region (it assumed that none of the
intermediate entities have previously cached certificates).
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CA

4: CA2 = ?

3: CA2 = ?

5: CA(CA2)

CA1
6: CA(CA2)

CA2

7: CA(CA2)
V2
2: CA2 = ?

1: CV2(M), CA2(CV2)

V1

8: CA2(CV2) = OK

Figure 4.2: Certificate verification. (1) V2 sends a signed message along with its certificate to V1. V1
does not have certificate CA2 in its cache and therefore cannot verify CV2. (2, 3) V1 asks for CA2
from its regional CA via roadside unit. (4) Regional CA may have to ask central CA for the CA2. (5,
6, 7) Certificate CA(CA2) is sent to V1 via regional CA and roadside unit. (8) V1 verifies the
certificate CA2/CV2 and accepts the message. (Note: CAx(CVy) is a certificate issued to vehicle y by a
CA of region x and dotted circle indicates a region.)

Further, it also makes revocation difficult since revocation list (RL) must be distributed to all regions
as vehicles are not restricted to remain within their regions. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of RL
in case of two regional CAs. If pseudonyms are preloaded in TPDs then certificate revocation for a
particular vehicle must include all the pseudonyms currently issued to (stored in) the vehicle. The RL
may grow over time, making its distribution more difficult.
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Central Certification Authority - CA
2

X

X

CA2(CV2)

CA2(CV2)

3

1

3

1

CA (Region 1) – CA1

X

CA2(CV2)

CA (Region 2) – CA2

X

CA2(CV2)

X

CA2(CV2)

Figure 4.3: Distribution of certificate revocation list. (1) CA (Region 2) revokes certificate of a
vehicle in its region, it distributes the revocation information within its region and also forwards it to
central CA. (2) Central CA forwards revocation information to all regional CAs. (3) Each regional
CA disseminates revocation information within its region. (Note: CAx(CVy) is a certificate issued to
vehicle y by a CA of region x and circles indicate regions.)

Each vehicle will have an associated certificate since its manufacture, this will be modified or
updated each time the owner changes. These certificates will be expensive and it will also be
technically difficult for an average user to keep track of the certificate renewal etc (even if he is not
using the services). Further, in case of possible compromise, the revocation and issuance of new
certificate may be quite cumbersome.

In current designs, too much trust is placed on TPD, which stores all cryptographic materials
(permanent certificate and pseudonyms), performs cryptographic operations (signing/verifying
messages) and processes revocation messages/commands (erase keys/pseudonyms when revoked)
[10]. Since the vehicle (and TPD) cannot be physically guarded as other electronic security devices
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(smart cards etc), those requirements will make the device quite expensive [14]. Further, the
pseudonyms when exhausted must be reloaded thus requiring a periodic maintenance.

The initial deployment stage of VANET will be characterized by limited infrastructure and small
number of smart vehicles, which means very limited vehicle to vehicle and vehicle to infrastructure
communication. During this stage, the solutions that assume omnipresence of these
communications for certificate issuance, verification or revocation will not be practicable. Further,
lack of infrastructure will discourage consumers’ participation and lack of consumers (smart
vehicles) will discourage providers’ investment in infrastructure.

In order to achieve the desired security attributes, two different distributed security architecture for
VANET that do not rest on expensive security hardware or elaborate security infrastructure. are
presented:


Service oriented security architecture: The architecture is based on spatial and temporal
restricted certificates, which are issued upon user’s request and can be used for various
VANET applications. Due to the restricted nature of these certificates, the certificate
revocation process is simple and efficient. The architecture can be incrementally deployed,
facilitating small companies to jump in the VANET business, and can fill the void during the
VANET initial deployment phase.



General purpose security architecture: The security architecture uses revised Blind
signature scheme. It provides “one-way-link-ability” that helps to achieve all the security
attributes without introducing complex/multi-transaction procedures. It does not require
expensive TPDs or complex pseudonym issuance/revocation procedures and is especially
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suited to VANET during initial deployment phase which is characterized with intermittent
connectivity. Further, non-repudiation/revocation requires cooperation between multiple
entities thus ensuring privacy without a single point of failure.

The chapter is organized in five sections. Section 4.1 discusses related research work in the field.
Section 4.2 introduces the system model. Section 4.3 discusses the proposed service oriented
security architecture. Section 4.4 discusses the proposed general purpose security architecture. And
in the end, section 4.5 presents conclusion.

4.1

Related Work

Papadimitratos et al. [1, 10, 11] have presented a quite comprehensive solution based on
central/regional certification authorities and their trust relationships. The solution uses pseudonyms
to address privacy issues. The pseudonyms are preloaded in TPD [10] or issued by pseudonym
provider [11] or generated by TPD and signed by CA [1]. They have also highlighted multiple
revocation protocols. The solution requires the TPD, of the vehicle whose certificates have been
revoked, to delete all stored pseudonyms and also assumes CA to have some knowledge about
vehicles location. A malicious node may avoid this deletion by blocking the revocation message.
This may enable him to use the pseudonyms later for communication with other vehicles. Other
options are distribution of compressed RL or using bloom filters. TPD management through signed
messages from CA may be exploited to evade revocation or for other malicious purposes such as
DoS attacks (causing victim’s TPD to delete key material, etc). [1] leaves misbehavior detection on
vehicle, between infrequent RL distributions.
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The distribution of RL to all smart vehicle/regions is also a challenge. Papadimitratos et al. suggest
restricting the scope of RL within a region, and requiring visiting nodes from other regions to obtain
temporary certificates [15]. Thus a vehicle will have to acquire temporary certificates if it is travelling
outside its registered region.

In [2] Armknecht et al. propose a public key infrastructure where users derive public keys,
certificates and pseudonyms. The architecture is based on elliptic curves, each user gets a master key
and master certificate from CA. It can then generate its key pairs or certificate using masker key,
master certificate and its own secret key. The certificate generated by user is verifiable by CA’s
public key. For revocation the CA publishes some data, depending on which all nodes have to
update their keys. The excluded nodes cannot update the keys based on this data. This means for
each revocation everybody has to update their certificates.

In [3] Fan et al. present detailed operation of public key infrastructure mechanism based on bilinear
mapping. They achieve privacy through pseudonyms which are generated by users themselves
similar to [2]. Revocation is accomplished through distribution of RL that is stored by each user.
Every time a user receives a beacon it performs certain computations on complete RL to ensure that
the received beacon is from unrevoked user.

In [4] Rahman et al. present an automated crash reporting application. For privacy, they use Blind
signature scheme to get anonymous credentials signed by local certification authority (government
transportation authority -GTA) through a multiple transaction protocol. They achieve nonrepudiation by adding an invisible identity field in pseudonym. A vehicle’s unique identity (within a
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GTA’s domain) is doubly encrypted (first by GTA’s public key then by local law enforcement
authority’s public key) to get an invisible identity. They suggest using cut-and-choose method to
ensure that blind messages are well formed, which has high overheads especially to confirm the
invisible-identity. Further, the cut-and-choose method will reveal the identity of vehicle thus
compromising privacy.

In [8, 17] Lin et al. present a security mechanism using group signature and identity based signature
techniques. The solution minimizes the storage at CA for later liability establishment, however the
revocation is road side unit aided. CA sends RL to roadside unit which then monitors certificates in
messages broadcasted by passing-by vehicles and if a message with revoked certificate is observed
then roadside unit broadcasts warning messages. In another option it is suggested that each passingby vehicle get its certificate signed from roadside unit. These signatures are then used to show that
the certificate has not been revoked. First option is open to attacks (malicious node does not
transmit within range of a roadside unit) and second increases complexity and overhead.

IEEE P1609.2 [9] proposes a CA based architecture. The architecture assumes pervasive roadside
architecture and does not offer certificate revocation options.

In [16] Parno et al. present detailed discussion on challenges faced by vehicular network, adversaries,
attacks and propose a set of security primitives. They suggest a dynamic key distribution system,
where each node generates its own short term key pair and requests CA to issue a certificate based
on generated public key. They also suggest using group signatures to achieve anonymity.
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Our general purpose security architecture comes closer to the method presented by [5, 6]. In [5],
Fisher et al. used a large number of pseudonyms (defined as Inter-Vehicle-Communication-IVC
certificates) to achieve un-link-ability. These pseudonyms are blindly signed by IVC certification
servers’ (ICS) private key. The private signing key is shared amongst multiple ICS by means of
Secret Sharing. An IVC certificate is distributedly calculated through a quorum of ICS. For nonrepudiation a tag, that can be linked to the vehicle, is generated/stored by ICS and is protected by a
secret key shared amongst ICS. The solution requires transactions with multiple servers to get a
pseudonym which may be difficult due to intermittent connectivity in VANET. Further, a
pseudonym cannot be revoked during its validity period, and no definite solution to malformed
pseudonyms (having validity larger than defined maximum period) has been defined. In [6], Schaub
et al. also use pseudonyms to achieve un-link-ability. The pseudonyms are issued by pseudonym
providers (PPk) based on V-tokens (that also later form part of pseudonyms), V-tokens cannot be
linked to the each other or to the owner by PPk thus ensuring privacy. V-tokens, containing
identifying information of the vehicle and Certification Authority (CA), are blindly signed by CA
after being encrypted by vehicle with public key of resolution authority (RA). The decryption ability
of V-tokens (i.e., resolution/non-repudiation) is distributed using threshold encryption scheme. The
solution relies on cut-and-choose method to ensure well-form-ness of V-tokens, thus adding
overheads in addition to the need of TPD (to store the V-tokens or corresponding pseudonyms).
Further, the revocation method only revokes long-term identity and does not address already issued
pseudonyms/V-tokens which may continue to be used for malicious purpose.

96

4.2

4.2.1

System Model

Security Objectives

VANET’s security requirements are more complex than other wired/wireless networks. In addition
to basic security attributes of authentication, confidentiality and integrity, it also requires nonrepudiation, revocation and privacy. These additional security attributes are briefly discussed below:

Non-repudiation: A user should not be able to later deny that she originated a message. It
adds liability to user for the messages which she generates. This is especially important in
case of VANET safety applications. If this requirement is not fulfilled then a malicious node
may generate fake public safety message without any liability.



Revocation: Revocation of user’s credentials is also an important security attribute. It helps
to minimize the damages if a user’s credentials are lost or a user engages in malicious activity.



Privacy: Privacy is one of the most important security attributes in VANET applications.
This is due to the fact that VANET communication can be used to track a vehicle (driver)
which causes great concerns to many users. Privacy comes in direct conflict with the other
security attributes. One has to strike a balance between privacy protection and the other
security attributes, especially non-repudiation.

4.2.2

Threat Model

We do not make very stringent security requirements for vehicle’s on-board device or restrict the
capabilities of attacker node. We assume that an attacker is capable of:
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eavesdropping when within the routing path or in the transmission range of a message



injecting, modifying, spoofing or dropping the messages



trying to track the movement of another vehicle either alone or in collaboration with other
mobile or fixed nodes (total number of such collaborating nodes will be a small fraction of
all the nodes participating in the network since we assume that majority of nodes are honest)



taking complete control of her on-board device and also crafting any protocol related
messages

4.2.3

Desired Requirements

Keeping in mind VANET characteristics, attacker capabilities and security attributes, our desired
requirements for the proposed security architecture are:

Ensure authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, revocation and privacy.



Guard against traceability by one or more collaborating entities. An attacker alone or with
collaboration of limited other mobile or fixed nodes should not able to track a user. In other
words, two messages from the same user should not be linkable (if desired).



Ensure privacy revocation involves multiple authorities. A single authority, by itself alone,
should not be able to revoke the privacy of a user. Privacy revocation could only be achieved
by cooperation of multiple identities.



Provide security without need of expensive TPDs, or large storage requirements at central
authority/ RSU.



Guard against a user using legitimate pseudonyms for malicious purposes such as Sybil
attack, etc.

98



Do not require multiple transactions for various routine operations, such as certificate
issuance, certificate revocation, etc. This is especially necessary due to the intermittent nature
of connectivity of VANET.

4.3

Service Oriented Security Architecture

To address the security challenges during initial deployment stage, a distributed certificate
architecture is proposed. This initial deployment stage will be characterized by very few smart
vehicles and lack of necessary roadside infrastructure to support various VANET applications or
elaborate security architecture. The proposed architecture achieves desired security attributes and
enables service providers to incrementally offer various VANET services with minimal investment
thus encouraging both service providers and users to try/adopt VANET. Certificates with a limited
scope in both time and space domain are issued by a service provider. These certificates are usable
within a particular geographic area or within a certain time or both. These certificates are not tied to
the vehicle’s registration etc and can be changed periodically during one service period. Meanwhile
law enforcement agencies can trace back the user via the temporary certificate and the service
provider.

4.3.1

Assumptions

Our solution is based on a few simple assumptions given below:


The user/node (we use user/node/vehicle interchangeably) has a payment-processingdevice (similar to automatic toll payment devices - sold for tens of dollars). We do not
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require the device to store pseudonyms, perform cryptographic operations (such as
signing/verifying messages) or perform revocation operation. The device only participates
in credential/service request operations (discussed later).


The user/node has a wireless-communication/VANET-application device that can
communicate with roadside infrastructure; it can be a laptop or a hand-held device or a
device

specially

designed

for

smart

vehicles.

The

device

can

communicate

(wired/wireless/WiFi/Bluetooth) with the payment-processing-device.


Limited local roadside units are available (the existing hotspots in urban areas may be used
for this purpose) and service providers can be accessed through these roadside units.

4.3.2

Basic Solution

The basic solution only caters for the provision of temporary credentials so that the required security
attributes are achieved. These temporary credentials (pseudonyms) can then be used for basic
vehicle to vehicle communication or participation in VANET safety application (such as
initiating/relaying safety information).

The basic idea is that if a user wants to participate in a VANET (the user’s vehicle is not required to
have a manufacturer’s issued certificate), he purchases a payment-processing-device (As mentioned
above, it is assumed that user also has a VANET application device, which is running desired
VANET applications). Each device will have an identification and an associated certificate. During
initialization the device will be linked/registered with the user’s account. The user’s information will
be maintained with the provider and will not be stored in the device. The basic procedure is
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illustrated in Figure 4.4. When a user enters a service area and wants to use the service, he makes the
payment for the service using onboard payment device. The payment-authorization/service-request
message will be encrypted using the provider’s public key, thus hiding the device ID/certificate and
services requested from eavesdroppers. The user is issued a pseudonym by the provider that will be
valid for a given period/area.

1
1
3

3
2

2

4
4

Figure 4.4: Architecture (1) Users register their payment devices with Provider beforehand (2) Users
send payment/service requests (3) Provider issues temporary credentials (4) Users participate in
VANET via vehicle to vehicle or vehicle to infrastructure communication.

We define several notations/functions that we will use in the formal description of our solution. A
certificate or a pseudonym will essentially be represented by its public and private key pair; such as
( K x , K x ) are public (+) and private (-) keys belonging to X. (ts , t f ) are the start and finish times

between which a particular pseudonym (P) will be valid. A certificate can be valid inside a service
area; service areas can be defined with region numbers R, large service areas may have more than
one region. A user specifies the region and time period, in the request, for which he/she wants to
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purchase the certificate. EK (M ) defines an encryption function on message M using the public key


K  . Public cryptography is very resource intensive therefore data encryption is usually carried out

using a randomly generated symmetric session key and only the session key is encrypted using public
cryptography. The encryption function EK (M ) defined above employs similar techniques; we will


not show the details for simplicity and compactness. SK ( M )  N , defines a signature function on



message M using a private key K . The signatures are computed by first creating a message digest

using a hashing function and then encrypting the digest using key K  . VK ( M , N ) is a signature


verification function. It has two inputs the message M and the signature N. It verifies the signature
by computing the message digest of message M and comparing it with received signatures N (after
decrypting it with the corresponding public key K  ).

If a user U having a public key pair ( KU , KU ) (for initial request these are the permanent keys
associated with the payment-processing device) wants to acquire temporary credentials for the time
duration defined by (ts , t f ) and within the region R from a service provider S with a public key pair
( K S , K S ) , Figure 4.5 shows the transactions.

4.3.3

Extended Services

The solution can be easily extended for extended/additional services. If additional VANET services
or applications are available (such as multimedia content, web access, email etc) then these can be
offered as extended services. In this case a user indicates the service which he desires to
use/purchase in service request/payment authorization message. The payment processing provider
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issues the temporary credentials to the user and also forwards these credentials along with the details
of service purchased to the concerned server. The user can then initiate request to the concerned
server for service using issued temporary credentials. Figure 4.6 shows such a scenario. The
Extended services will include the basic service (basic service only provides pseudonym).
1

U:

Generate M  {t s , t f , R, U }
Compute M R  E K  (M )
s

Compute N R  S K  (M )
U

2
3

U S:
S:

MR,NR
Extract M
VK  ( M , N R )

a

U

Verify ID U and associated account
Generate P  {t s , t f , R, K P } , K P b
Compute M P  E K  ( P, K P )
U

Compute N P  S K  (P)
S

Compute N K  S K  ( K P )
S

4
5

S U :
S:

MP,NP, NK
Extract P and K P

V K  ( P, N P ) , V K  ( K P , N K )
S

a

S

The service provider records device’s public key during user/device registration/initialization process.
is the pseudonym/temporary certificate with associated private key K P

bP

Figure 4.5: Transactions between User U and Provider S to acquire temporary credential
{ts , t f , R, K P , K P } ; valid for time duration defined by (ts , t f ) and within region R. User uses (P, NP) as
a temporary certificate.

It is not necessary that the payment-processing provider is also operating the application servers;
these servers can be operated by other providers. In this case, the payment-processing provider
provides temporary credentials and processes the payments on behalf of other providers; similar to
credit card providers.
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1
4

2
3

Credential
Provider

5

6

Server

Figure 4.6: Extended services architecture (1) User registers payment device with Credential provider
(2) User sends payment/service request (3) Credential provider issues temporary credentials (4)
Credential provider informs Server of service purchased and temporary credentials (5) User requests
service using temporary credentials (6) Server delivers content.

4.3.4

Provision of Privacy

The privacy is one of the most important security attributes in VANET. The proposed solution
provides this through pseudonyms which cannot be linked to the user ID. For additional privacy the
pseudonyms can be refreshed within one service period. There are two possible options for this; the
pseudonyms are issued in bulk at the time of purchase or a new pseudonym is issued sometime
before the expiry of the old pseudonym.

In case of bulk issuance of pseudonyms there are a few aspects to be considered. The number of
pseudonyms is related to time period for which the service has been purchased and desired level of
privacy (i.e. how often the pseudonyms are changed). (We are not considering the exact time period
or methodology for changing pseudonyms; this has been studied in detail by other researchers [1,
18-20, 23].). The validity period of each pseudonym is also important. If multiple pseudonyms have
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overlapping validity periods, they may be used for Sybil attacks. Although each pseudonym can be
traced back to the user via a payment-processing-provider, this can only be done by law
enforcement/government agencies and not by ordinary users. Another important aspect is the
length and number of messages that are required to send these pseudonyms to the user/server and
also the storage requirement at server/user device. If the pseudonyms are sent in one or multiple
continuous messages, a malicious server (not the credential provider) may be able to link the
pseudonyms and compromise user’s privacy. For this reason, the credential provider should first
mix/group the pseudonyms of different users (that will be served by same server) with each other
and then send them to a service provider. User’s applications also need to be careful about changing
the pseudonyms to ensure security and uninterrupted service, for example not changing a
pseudonym within a transaction or between multiple transactions that can be linked based on
context (accessing one’s email).

In case of single issuance of pseudonym the most important aspect is to ensure that the user gets
new pseudonym before the expiry of current one. There are two options for this, either the user
initiates request for a new pseudonym before the expiry of current one or the server maintains state
for each user and issues a new pseudonym before the expiry of current pseudonym. Letting users
initiate requests is more practicable since it will save server’s resources and the complexity of
message delivery (the user can initiate request anywhere within the service area).

Besides certificates (pseudonym) other IDs (such as IP address, MAC address etc) are also important
to hide in ensuring privacy [21, 22]. These IDs can be issued on temporary basis and refreshed
several times during a service period similar to pseudonyms.
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The certificate of CA (also the payment-processing-provider) is hard coded in the payment device,
enabling other users to check the validity of a certificate.

4.3.5

Practicability

The proposed solution is incremental, practicable and requires minimal infrastructure, which is
especially advantageous during the initial deployment phase of VANET. The payment-processingdevice does not need to have many functionalities or high processing power or large storage. It is
similar to toll-payment-devices which are commonly being used and can be purchased for tens of
dollars.

The payment-processing-device is not tied to a particular vehicle so a user is free to transfer it from
one vehicle to another. The payment-processing provider is similar to credit card providers; we are
using the mature Internet-like payment-processing architecture which is considered to be secure.

The application servers can be installed by different operators and existing hot spots in urban areas
may be initially used to test the architecture.

Software can be developed for laptops and handheld devices to participate in different VANET
applications. This will also provide a framework where different VANET applications can be tried
or tested.
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4.3.6

Analysis

The proposed architecture ensures desired security attributes. Authentication and confidentiality can
be achieved by signing/encrypting the messages using associated public keys. Attacker cannot link
the pseudonyms with a user; even different pseudonyms cannot be linked with each other, thus
ensuring privacy. Meanwhile, liability can be enforced with the help of payment processing provider,
since it has the account information for each issued pseudonym.

The architecture, as opposed to existing solutions, does not require users to maintain permanent
(long-term) or valid temporary certificates when they are not using the service; user purchases a
certificate only when he/she wants to use the service. The architecture also simplifies the certificate
revocation; certificates automatically expire after their validation time or beyond the predefined
service area. For each new issuance of a certificate the provider checks if a previous certificate for
the same user was revoked (each user account has an associated revocation flag that indicates
whether a previous certificate of user was revoked or not. The provider can reset the flag if the user
later clears the cause of revocation). If a revocation entry exists then new certificate will not be
issued. Further, if the certificate is to be revoked before its expiry then revocation list (RL) can be
disseminated via roadside units. Since the service is area/time restricted so the RL will be distributed
only within the affected area and will contain only the certificates which have still not expired (due
to time). This simplifies RL maintenance and distribution.

The system does not require centralized CA or trust relationships among regional CAs. Each
provider can work independently within its coverage area. This minimizes the infrastructure required
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by a service provider to start its services and will be an incentive for service providers and facilitate
small companies jumping into the VANET industry. Initially, a service provider may limit its service
within a geographic area and later incrementally extend it. Further, when isolated/widely-separated
service areas become adjacent, due to the extensions, then they can be combined as one region or
roaming can be coordinated between the regions. Users and providers both benefit with incremental
deployment without paying unnecessarily for the services they do not use or sell. The solution does
not require expensive tamper proof devices and periodic refilling of pseudonyms. A user only pays
when using the service and does not pay for certificate maintenance.

Payment devices may be operated by a third party and integrated with service providers; one device
may be used by different service providers. Further, development of payment device will be
motivated by service providers, who will force security and affordability of the devices. The
architecture derives its security from the mature Internet payment systems.

As a baseline service, the temporary credentials can be used for all VANET applications including
vehicle to vehicle communications. Further, our solution can coexist with the solutions that are
based on the certificate authority and changing pseudonyms (such as [1-3, 9]), therefore smart
vehicles equipped with TPDs and vehicles using our solution can coexist and make use of the
service provided by the providers. This ensures smooth transition and unlimited overlapping of both
solutions.

The certificates can be used for other cryptographic primitives, such as session keys between users,
group keys within area for broadcast/multicast of a particular service etc. The solution can guard
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against Sybil attacks, since one payment processing device will be issued one certificate, if more than
one payment device is used then it is possible, but the attacker has to pay for the Sybil node also.

4.4

General Purpose Security Architecture

The security architecture is based on revised Blind scheme. The architecture satisfies required
security attributes by using carefully-designed pseudonyms. The pseudonyms are refreshed by
vehicles via Roadside Units (RSUs) using revised Blind signature scheme. To refresh pseudonyms, a
vehicle uses its previous valid certificate to authenticate its blinded pseudonym-signature-request
message to a passing-by RSU. The RSU generates/stores a tag/link based on its received blinded
pseudonym-signature-request message and the certificate that was used to authenticate the message.
The tag/link helps to ensure non-repudiation and certificate revocation. It does not require multiple
sessions or multiple RSUs to generate this tag/link. The original Blind signature scheme has been
modified by enforcing a condition on the blinding factor; this also helps to guard against other
attacks towards the original Blind signature scheme (discussed later). It does not generate
pseudonyms, with overlapping validity, in bulk which must be guarded against malicious use by
user/attacker (e.g., by storing these in a TPD). The non-overlapping pseudonyms or other long term
certificates (that may exist at any time) can be securely stored without need of TPD by employing
methods that are currently being used in securing certificates in personal computers/servers. The
architecture satisfies all security attributes without requiring expensive TPDs or complex multi-step
transactions with multiple certificate servers. The architecture does not require users to trust a party
with their private/secret keys and thus will have more user acceptance. Further, non-
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repudiation/revocation requires cooperation between multiple entities thus ensuring privacy without
a single point of failure.

4.4.1

Basic Blind Signature - Introduction

Blind signature scheme was first introduced by Chaum [7]. It makes use of multiplicative property of
RSA (discussed below). Blind signature scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography can be used
interchangeably; we will restrict ourselves to RSA based scheme only.

Entity A wants to get message m blindly signed by entity B; m could be hash of some message M.
Note that the entity A may need to prove to entity B that it is entitled to receive blind signatures.
The authentication could be done using some token or signatures on message m. The details of
authentication are omitted, since it is not essential to the basic concept of Blind signatures. The
Blind signature scheme is shown in Figure 4.7.

Given m, s and public parameters, the signatures are valid if y = m; where y = (s)e = (md) e = m mod n.
The Blind signature scheme can be used to certify pseudonyms; but it raises many security issues,
such as:


There is no way to ensure non-repudiation and certificate revocation, since newly signed
pseudonyms cannot be linked to authenticator/node (i.e., given <m, s> it is not possible to
construct m' (i.e., blinded m) or a link to authenticator of m').
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The signed pseudonyms may be used to launch Sybil attacks, and we cannot deal with it
since there is no way to link pseudonyms with each other or with the true identity of the
node.



A node with valid authenticator may share its pseudonyms with another node that does not
have a valid authenticator and who is unable to get pseudonyms.
A:

1.

Generate random number r: gcd (r, n)=1

2.

Compute blinding factor bf: bf = re

3.

Blind message m to m' : m' = bf m = (re m) mod n

A → B: 4.

m'

B:

Sign message m' using private key d: x = (m')d mod n

5.

B → A: 6.

x

A:

7.

Recover message signature: s = md = r-1(x)mod n

8.

r-1(x)mod n = r-1(m')d mod n= r-1(re m)d mod n
= r-1r md mod n = md mod n

Figure 4.7: Basic Blind signature scheme (public key parameters: n, e = public key of B and d= secret
key of B).

4.4.2

Proposed Architecture

The architecture uses a certificate chain consisting of long-term and short-term certificates. Initially,
a long-term certificate is used to get the initial short-term certificate and later a new short-term
certificate can be obtained based on the previous short-term certificate, thus making a certificate
chain (details discussed later in this section). We have revised the Blind signature scheme to meet
our requirements of non-repudiation and revocation.
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4.4.2.1

Notations and Function Definitions

We define several notations and functions which we will use in formal description of our
architecture. A certificate or pseudonym Certx is essentially defined by its associated identification
IDx and key pair (Px , Sx); public key Px forms part of certificate and secret key Sx is known only to
the holder of Certx. Sig-Certx (M)=N, is a signature function on message M using key Sx or certificate
Certx. The signature N is computed by first creating a message digest (Mh = Hash(M)) using some
well known hashing function (such as SHA1) and then encrypting the digest using key Sx. VerSigCertx (M, N), is a signature verification function with two inputs: the message M and the signature N.
It verifies the signature by computing the message digest of message M and comparing it with
received signature N (after decrypting it with the corresponding public key Px). Note that knowledge
of Certx is needed for function VerSig-Certx (M, N). Certx should either be publicly available or
attached along with the Sig-Certx (M). In the rest of the chapter it is assumed that Certx is either
publicly available or attached along with the Sig-Certx (M), and will not be explicitly mentioned.

4.4.2.2 Proposed Revised Blind Signature Scheme

In order to address the security issues of the original Blind signature scheme and to satisfy our
security objectives, we revised Blind signature scheme (Figure 4.8). Our proposed scheme achieves
one-way-link-ability, i.e., given a blinded pseudonym (m') the signer cannot find the un-blinded
pseudonym (m), but given a certificate (<un-blinded pseudonym -m, signatures -s>) the signer can
construct the associated blinded pseudonym (m') and find a link to its authenticator (authenticator of
m'). One-way-link-ability ensures privacy since the signer, at the time of signing signatures, cannot
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determine the pseudo-credentials. Whereas for revocation/non-repudiation (given the pseudonym),
it is possible to construct the chain/link leading to the node’s true identity.
V:

1.

Generate Certi = < IDi , Pi > and Si ;
IDi = bf = re ; where IDi is pseudo ID,
Pi and Si are public and secret keys of V.

2.

Compute mi = Hash (Certi)

3.

Compute mi' = bf mi = IDi mi = (re mi) mod n

V → R:

4.

mi', Ti , Sig-Certi-1 (mi'), Certi-1

R:

5.

Verify Certi-1 for time-period validity and revocation.
(details in certificate revocation)

6.

VerSig-Certi-1 (mi', Sig-Certi-1 (mi'))

7.

Compute x =(mi')d mod n

8.

Store link <mi', Ti , Certi-1> or alternatively
< mi', Ti , mi-1' >

R → V:

9.

x, Ti , Sig-CertR (Ti)

V:

10. Recover certificate signature Sig-CertR (Certi ):
Sig-CertR (Certi ) = s = (mi)d = r-1(x) mod n
11. Use <Certi , Ti , Sig-CertR(Certi), Sig-CertR(tn), CertR>
as new credentials

Figure 4.8: Proposed revised Blind signature scheme – initial version (public key parameters: n, e =
public key of R, d = secret key of R).

Suppose that vehicle V has a current certificate Certi-1 which is valid for time period Ti-1 (time period
defines a start and an end time) and now needs to get a new certificate Certi valid for time period Ti
from a nearby RSU R (Figure 4.8). V generates Certi (step 1), blinds the certificate using public
credentials of RSU R (steps 2, 3), authenticates the blind-signature-request-message with Certi-1 and
sends the request to the RSU (step 4). RSU R verifies validity of Certi-1 (step 5), verifies signatures on
request (step 6), generates/stores the tag/link (steps 7, 8) and sends signed message to V (step 9). V
un-blinds the message to get the signatures on pseudonyms (step 10) and then uses the pseudonym
as required (step 11), but makes sure to not use Certi with R.
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The solution ensures one-way-link-ability to achieve non-repudiation/revocation: Certi cannot be
generated from mi', but mi' can be generated from Certi and mi' can be linked to Certi-1. Note that
revocation/non-repudiation cannot be accomplished by a single signing RSU (or a few RSUs); it
requires cooperation between all involved RSUs to reconstruct the chain/link iteratively. The utility
of one-way-link-ability rests on the assumption that a node should not declare (use) the un-blinded
pseudonym to (with) the RSU who issued signatures on its blinded version.

The solution shares a limitation with Blind signature scheme, i.e., the signer cannot ensure that the
blinded message (certificate) is well-formed (constructed as per agreed protocol/scheme).
Specifically the RSU cannot ensure bf =IDi . One commonly used solution is to use cut-and-choose
method [4, 6]. Here the user sends multiple certificates to the signer (e.g., user sends two blinded
messages, if she wants to get signatures on one); the signer can then choose which half to sign and
the user un-blinds the other half for the signer to check if these were well-formed or not. This
reduces the success probability of attacks by malicious users but at the same time adds considerable
overhead, which is not affordable in the face of intermittent connectivity in VANET environment.
In order to address this vulnerability, we have further refined the Blind signature scheme. The
modifications are given in Figure 4.9 (only shows the several revised steps in the initial proposed
approach given in Figure 4.8).

Sig-CertR (mi'H || Ti) is the modified Blind signature, which serves three purposes: attaching a
certificate-valid-time-period condition to the signature, adding link-ability to the certificate for later
non-repudiation/revocation purpose, and guarding against malicious use of the signature
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(malforming the blind message, changing ID to make certificate un-linkable, sharing the signed
certificate, etc ). 1

R:

7.
8.

Compute mi'H= Hash (mi')
Store link <mi' H, Ti , Certi-1> or alternatively
< mi'H , Ti , mi-1'H >

R → V: 9.

mi'H , Ti , Sig-CertR (mi'H || Ti) ;
x||y is concatenation of x and y.

V:

Use <Certi , Ti , Sig-CertR(mi'H || Ti), CertR>
as new credentials

10.

Figure 4.9: Proposed revised Blind signature scheme – final version.

4.4.3

System Setup

Three types of certificates have been defined: permanent certificates, long-term/daily certificates,
and short-term/temporary certificates (i.e., pseudonyms) (Figure 4.10). Each vehicle will have a
permanent certificate that is registered with a Central Certification authority (CCA) similar to vehicle
registration authority. The CCA can be state or country based and its operational area is divided into
regions, with each region having a Regional Certification Authority (RCA). A vehicle on entering a
region registers itself with the RCA; RCA in turn updates the vehicle’s current region information on
CCA (the update only takes place when a vehicle moves from one region to another). Either RCA or
CCA can confirm that the permanent certificate of vehicle has not been previously revoked. This
helps to target the revocation to concerned regions only, and hence, simplifies revocation and

To guard against blind decryption or blind signatures on some other message besides certificates, certification servers
will have different certificates for signing and encrypting other messages.
1
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reduces certificate revocation list (CRL) size. The size of a region depends on the desired privacy
granularity.

A vehicle gets one long-term certificate per day from RCA using proposed Blind signature scheme.
RCA stores the relevant link. One long-term certificate per day reduces the chain size which makes
revocation simple. A vehicle uses this long-term certificate to get its first short-term certificate (of
the day) from an RSU, using the proposed modified Blind signature scheme. The RSU stores the
relevant link/tag in its database and informs RCA (via a confirmation message) that a short-term
certificate has been issued based on a particular long-term certificate. The RCA modifies the
freshness/used bit associated with the record. If later the RCA receives another certificate-issueconfirmation-message for the same long-term certificate, it marks the vehicle as malicious and takes
appropriate measures such as certificate revocation. RSUs can use mi'H instead of un-blinded longterm certificate in confirmation message to further ensure privacy.

For each subsequent certificate, the vehicle uses its previous/last short-term certificate to
authenticate its current request. The issuing/signing RSU in this case sends a confirmation message
to the RSU who issued/signed the previous short-term certificate. The RSU who issued/signed the
previous short-term certificate then modifies the freshness/used flag associated with the record.
This ensures that more than one certificate are not issued based on one particular short-term
certificate. The time period of the new certificate will be non-overlapping and later than the
validation period of the previous certificate.
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Central Certification Authority - CCA
RCAx

CA (Region N) – RCAN

CA (Region 1) – RCA1
R1 mL'H

CertPerm- Vi Owner-Vi

CertPerm- Vi
Ri+1 mi'H

mi-1'H Ri-1

RSUs

Figure 4.10: Certificate Architecture: CCA maintains current RCA and permanent certificate to
owner link, RCA maintains permanent certificate to blinded-long-term certificate link and RSU that
reported usage of long-term certificate, each RSU maintains authenticating-certificate (and its issuer)
to blinded-short-term certificate link and the RSU that reported usage of issued short-term
certificate.

The issuer/signer (RCA/RSU) of authenticating certificate (Certi-1) while modifying the
freshness/used bit may also record the RSU which has sent the confirmation message. This will
simplify revocation process (discussed later in Section 4.4.4) but will also raise limited privacy issues
since the RSU knows the link to the next RSU as well as the previous RSU. Note that even with this
knowledge a single RSU cannot compromise the privacy of a vehicle; it still needs cooperation from
other RSUs, though in this case it knows the RSUs with which it should cooperate.

We require RSUs to send certificate-issue-confirmation-message to issuer/signer (RCA/RSU) of
authenticating certificate (Certi-1). This ensures that no more than one pseudonym with
same/overlapping validity will be issued. For this goal, the RSU sends certificate-issue-confirmationmessage to the issuer/signer (RCA/RSU) of authenticating certificate (Certi-1) and waits for a
timeout before signing new pseudonym. Issuer/signer (RCA/RSU) of authenticating certificate
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(Certi-1) responds within the timeout period only if malicious activity is detected. This ensures
desired security with minimum overhead.

4.4.4

Security Attributes

Confidentiality, integrity, and authentication can be achieved by using short-term certificates for
signatures and/or encryption. Rest of the security attributes are discussed below:

4.4.4.1

Privacy

The solution ensures privacy since the RCA/RSUs do not know the ID and public keys of a vehicle
at the time of signing the blinded certificate. Further, since a vehicle gets a short-term certificate
from one RSU and uses it later with another RSU, a single RSU cannot link different short-term
certificates of a particular vehicle. Tracing is possible but quite difficult for attackers, which can be
achieved only when all the RSUs that issued certificates to a particular vehicle cooperate with each
other. Even if attackers can trace a vehicle in this way, the true ID of a vehicle cannot be determined
without the help from RCA. Also, RCA by itself cannot compromise the privacy of the vehicle. This
property improves users’ confidence since even the government authority itself cannot compromise
user privacy---government authority must get cooperation from commercial operators who operate
the RSUs in order to trace a vehicle and its user.
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4.4.4.2 Non-repudiation (Liability)

If a malicious message, signed by a particular certificate, has been identified then the privacy of
signer can be revoked with the cooperation between RCA and RSUs. The signed message will
contain the information < Certi , Ti , Sig-CertRn (mi'H || Ti), CertRn>. It is assumed that the certificate
and signatures on the malicious message are valid, since if the certificate is not valid then the
message will be discarded and there will be no need of revocation. The revocation is performed
backwards iteratively as following (refer to Figure 4.11):


RSU – Rn will generate mn'H , locate the record and find corresponding Certn-1.



It will then forward the revocation request to RSU-Rn-1 which issued Certn-1.



The chain will be followed till first RSU and then RCA which will reveal the true ID of
malicious vehicle (based on long-term certificate).

CCA
RCA1 CertPerm- V1 Owner-V1

V?=CertPerm- V1
6

RCA1

R1 mL'H

2

V? (mL'H)
RSU-R1
R2

Owner? (Certi , Sig-CertR3 )

7

CertPerm- V1

Owner (V1)

Law
Enforcement
Authority

V? (mi'H)

5

m1'H mL'H RCA1

RSU-R3

RSU-R2
V? (m1'H)

1

4

R3

-

m2'H m1'H R1

V? (m2'H)

m3'H m2'H R2
3

Figure 4.11: Non-repudiation procedure: (1) Law enforcement forwards the short-term certificate
under investigation to CCA, (2) CCA forwards the blinded-short-term certificate to the concerned
RSU, (3,4) RSUs iteratively forward the blinded-authenticating-short-term certificate to its issuing
RSU, (5) RSU forwards the blinded-long-term certificate to RCA, (6) RCA forwards corresponding
permanent certificate to CCA, (7) CCA provides the ownership information to requesting Law
enforcement authority.
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4.4.4.3 Certificate Revocation

There may be a situation when the certificates of a particular vehicle are to be revoked. It is
important to note that the majority of vehicles will be honest and certificate revocation will not be
routine so the proposed protocol has been designed to minimize overheads in normal situations.
The certificate revocation decision may be made at CCA based on either request of user (for stolen
credentials) or law enforcement (for malicious use). The detail of decision methodology is out of
scope and will not be discussed. The CCA will inform the RCA of the region where the vehicle last
registered. Revocation is processed iteratively along the certificate chain in forward direction as
following (Figure 4.12):


RCA will check to see if the vehicle has already used its long-term certificate (to get shortterm certificate from some RSU) or not. If the vehicle did not get any short-term certificate
then RCA will revoke long-term certificate by broadcasting revocation command
containing the hash of the blinded long-term certificate (mi'H). RSUs will not issue first
short-term certificate based on this long-term certificate. The certificate revocation
command will expire after the validity of long-term certificate.



If the vehicle has used its long-term certificate to get the short-term certificate then the
RCA will broadcast revocation command to all RSUs containing hash of corresponding
blinded short-term certificate (mi'H). Note if the RCA maintains the ID of RSU that issued
the first short-term certificate (based on confirmation message sent by the RSU) then the
revocation command is only needed to be sent to the single RSU that issued the first shortterm certificate.



The RSU that issued the first short-term certificate will find the link and broadcast the
revocation command containing hash of corresponding blinded short-term certificate
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(mi'H). RSU may also acknowledge to the RCA. The broadcast may be limited to a few hops
since it is likely that vehicle would have got the next short-term certificate from some RSU
in geographical proximity of the first RSU. The broadcast range may be expanded if no
RSU acknowledges. Similarly if RSUs maintain the ID of the next RSU in certificate chain
then revocation message may be sent directly to the concerned RSU.


The revocation broadcast ends at the last RSU that issued the short-term certificate, the
RSU then broadcasts revocation message containing hash of current blinded short-term
certificate (mi'H). Other RSUs will not issue any new certificate based on this short-term
certificate and will also not trust any message signed by this certificate. RSUs may also
broadcast hash of current blinded short-term certificate (mi'H) to vehicles in the limited
region (the limit can be defined) within the validity time period of certificate.

CCA
RCA1 CertPerm- V1 Owner-V1

Revoke-CertPerm- V1
2

RCA1

R1 mL'H

Revoke - Owner

CertPerm- V1

1

Revoke(mL'H)
RSU-R1
R2

Law
Enforcement
Authority

3

m1'H mL'H RCA1

Revoke (m3'H)
Broadcast to
RSUs and vehicles

RSU-R3
-

m3'H m2'H R2

RSU-R2
Revoke(m1'H)

4

R3

6
5

m2'H m1'H R1

Revoke (m2'H)

Figure 4.12: Revocation Procedure: (1) Law enforcement authority forwards ownership information,
(2) CCA forwards the permanent certificate to concerned RCA for revocation, (3) RCA forwards the
blinded-long-term certificate to concerned RSU, (4,5) RSUs iteratively forward the blinded-shortterm certificate to next RSU that reported its usage as authenticating certificate (6) Last RSU
broadcasts the blinded-short-term certificate to all RSUs and nearby vehicles.
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4.5

Conclusion

Two different security architectures have been presented to address the security challenges during
initial deployment stage of VANET. The service oriented security architecture can be incrementally
deployed. Users are issued with temporary certificates which can only be used within a specific
geographic area and within a particular time period. This property also simplifies the certificate
revocation procedure. A framework has been presented which can be used to provide various
services to VANET by providers without investing much in infrastructure. The solution is intended
to stimulate people’s interest in VANET and build user/provider confidence. The general purpose
security architecture is based on revised Blind signature scheme. The Blind signature scheme has
been revised to ensure provision of all the security attributes. The solution does not require tamperproof-devices or multiple interactive transactions. Non-repudiation/revocation requires cooperation
between multiple entities thus ensuring privacy without a single point of failure.
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CHAPTER 5

OPTIMAL PLACEMENT OF RSUs

A vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) relies on three types of communication for its setup and
provision of services: vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication, vehicle to infrastructure (V2I)
communication and infrastructure to infrastructure (I2I) communication. All VANET applications
depend on either one or more of these communication types. V2V communication depends on the
number and location of vehicles, V2I communication depends on the number and location of
roadside units (RSUs) and I2I communication depends on availability of interconnecting network
between RSUs. Most of the VANET applications collect/disseminate information from/to vehicles.
The collection/dissemination of this information from/to vehicles takes place via roadside units
(RSUs). The effectiveness of this information flow depends on connection time/bandwidth.
Connection time, between vehicles and RSUs, can easily be improved by pervasive deployment of
RSUs. However, this is an expensive solution and will especially not be feasible during the initial
stages of VANET, when there will be very small number of vehicles and RSUs due to the low
market penetration of VANET-enabled vehicles or due to the deployment cost of RSUs. There is,
therefore a need to optimally place these RSUs in a given region/scenario in order to achieve
maximum performance.

The optimal placement of RSUs is strongly correlated to the type of environment i.e., along
highways or urban areas. We have therefore, considered the problem of optimal placement of RSUs
along highways or in urban areas separately with corresponding solutions. For optimal placement of
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RSUs along highways, we present a balloon optimization method (that uses balloon expansion
analogy to find optimal solution) and have compared it with an analytical optimization method (that
uses brute force to find optimal solution). For optimal placement of RSUs in urban areas, we
present two different solutions: Binary Integer Programming (BIP) method and a novel Balloon
Expansion Heuristic (BEH) method. BIP method utilizes branch and bound method to find optimal
solution, whereas, BEH method uses balloon expansion analogy to find optimal solution.

The focus is on applications that collect information, such as information about road conditions,
traffic conditions or traffic accident, from vehicles to nearby RSU system. We have incorporated the
vehicle density, vehicle speed, and the occurrence likelihood of an incident/event in our
optimization schemes. The optimization goal is to minimize the average reporting time for all
possible information reports in a local region; reporting time is defined as the time duration from
occurrence of an event till it is reported by a vehicle to an RSU. The proposed optimization schemes
can easily be extended to applications that disseminate information, here the optimization goal can
be the area covered within some time bounds.

The chapter is organized in four sections. Section 5.1 discusses the related research work. Section
5.2 discusses optimal placement of RSUs along highways. Section 5.3 discusses optimal placement of
RSUs in Urban areas. Section 5.4 concludes the chapter.
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5.1

Related Work

Earlier works in optimal placement in VANET include [3-11]. Lee et al. [3] seek optimal placement
of RSUs to improve connectivity. Each intersection is considered as a potential RSU location. These
potential locations are then ordered based on number of vehicle-reports received within
communication range of each RSU. The vehicle-reports are based on per minute locations reported
by taxis to telematics system. RSUs’ locations are then selected from this ordered list. The placement
scheme only considers taxi location reports and does not consider speed or density of all vehicles. It,
therefore, may not be able to achieve optimal connectivity for all vehicles.

Li et al. [4] consider the optimal placement of gateways, which connect RSUs (access points - AP) to
the Internet, while minimizing the average number of hops from APs to gateways. They consider
pervasive APs such that every vehicle is connected to an AP. They do not consider vehicle speed,
density or movement patterns.

Zhao et al. [5] optimize placement of Thowboxes, standalone units that act as relays, to improve
contact and data-rate/throughput within context of a delay tolerant network. They aim at improving
V2V communication and not the V2I communication.

Lochert et al. [6] use genetic algorithm for optimal placement of RSUs for a VANET traffic
information system. They use a hierarchical aggregation scheme to share traffic information among
vehicles and the optimal placement is aimed at minimizing the travel time based on this information
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sharing. The optimal placement is to minimize travel for some fixed landmarks and may not be
useful for travel between any two points in an area.

Sun et al. [7] optimize the location of RSUs such that vehicles can reach an RSU within some timing
constraint, given by sum of driving time and an overhead time (for adjusting the route), to update
short term certificates. The optimization scheme may require vehicles to change their route which
may have effects on local traffic condition. We do not have any route changing condition; we
optimally place the RSUs considering the vehicles current routes only.

Fiore et al. [8] optimally place RSUs (Access Points - AP) in an urban environment to improve
cooperative download of data among vehicles. They aim at placing the APs at a point where
maximum vehicles cross each other, this helps in relaying the data from AP to a downloading
vehicle via other vehicles. Trullols et al. [9] optimally deploy RSUs (Dissemination Points – DPs) in
an urban area to maximize the number of vehicles that contact the DPs. They also consider a second
case where, in addition to the number of vehicles that contact DPs, the contact times of vehicles are
also taken into consideration. Malandrino et al. [10] optimally deploy the RSUs (APs) to maximize
the system throughput. They consider both the V2I (or I2V) and V2V communications for optimal
placement of APs. Vehicle trajectory information (time and location) forms basis of this
optimization which may not be available in many cases. Zheng et al. [11] optimally deploy APs to
improve contact opportunity; defined in terms of time for which a user remains in contact with an
AP. A moving user may connect with different APs during different times whereas; we only
consider the time it takes for the vehicle to report an incident to first RSU it encounters. These
optimizations aims at transfer of data from RSUs to vehicles whereas, our optimization aims at
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transfer of data from vehicles to RSUs with an area coverage constraint. Also, we do not consider
V2V communication in our optimization problem.

The work is also related to the problem of facility location, where one or more facilities are
optimally located in a region to reduce the overall costs (to consumer and facility) [12, 13]. The work
does not aim at minimizing the overall costs (reporting time of events) rather it aims at minimizing
the average reporting time on each path/route basis; this need awareness to road topology. Further,
It also incorporates vehicle speed, vehicle density, probability of a vehicle to follow a particular route
and event distribution.

5.2

Optimal Placement of RSUs along Highways

Given a limited number of RSUs, the section addresses the issue of optimal placement of these
RSUs along highways with the goal of minimizing the average time taken for a vehicle to report an
event of interest to a nearby RSU. One obvious solution is to uniformly distribute the available
RSUs along the highway. This solution may be effective where the need of information
collection/dissemination is uniform along the whole road range of a highway, which may not always
be the case. For example, if we are interested in collection of information about road conditions
such as fog or ice, then some areas will always be more likely to have a fog or an ice condition than
the other areas. Finding the optimal solution via exhaustively checking all possible placement
strategies will become infeasible with the increase of the number of RSUs, e.g., on a 100Km highway
we can have approximately 200 candidate locations for RSUs (if RSU communication range is 250m
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and an RSU can only deployed after every 2x250m), and if we need to place 20 RSUs among these
locations then there will be 1.61 x 1027 different placement strategies.

We present a balloon optimization method (that uses balloon expansion analogy to find optimal
solution) and have compared it with an analytical optimization method (that uses brute force to find
optimal solution). We incorporate vehicle speed, vehicle density and the likelihood of occurrence of
an incident/event in our optimization scheme. Our optimization goal is to minimize the average
reporting time for all possible information reports in a local region; reporting time is defined as the
time duration from occurrence of an event till it is reported by a vehicle to an RSU. The proposed
optimization scheme can easily be extended to applications that disseminate information, here the
optimization goal can be the area covered within some time bounds.

5.2.1

System Model

The scope of this section is restricted to optimal placement of RSUs along one single highway. Let L
be the length of a highway and R be the communication range of an RSU/vehicle. If RSUs can only
be deployed after every 2xR distance then there will be

⌊

⌋ candidate locations. If M is

the number of available RSUs then we aim at placing these M RSUs among N locations such that
the average reporting time T(X) is minimized. X={x1, x2,.., xM} and xi is the location of RSUi.

The density and speed of vehicles along the highway is denoted by d(x) and s(x) respectively, where 0
≤ x ≤ L. For simplicity we consider a constant density D and constant speed S. If vehicles entering
the highway follow Poisson distribution then there will be λ = SD vehicles entering the highway per
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unit time. If y is the location of an incident/event that needs to be reported to RSU systems, a
vehicle will reach the point of incident with an exponentially distributed time (mean value is 1/λ).
Let f(x) define the distribution function of incidents/events along the highway. In order to simplify
evaluation, we have considered f(x) such that the locations of optimal RSUs can be derived
intuitively (the three scenarios shown in Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1: Incident/event distribution functions. (a) Flat (b) Step (c) Stair
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5.2.2

Simple (Analytical) Optimization

If an RSU is located at position x, then for an incident/event that happened at place y, the reporting
time t(x|y) is the summation of the time for a vehicle to arrive at y (denoted as ty) and the time for
the vehicle to reach x from y (denoted as ty→x ), see Equation 5.1. If density and speed for vehicles in
both directions are same then the average reporting time will be given by Equation 5.2.
|

|
∫

|

(5.1)

|

(5.2)

For M=1 (single RSU placement problem), T(x) for all possible locations of the single RSU is shown
in Figure 5.2. The optimal position of the RSU should have the minimum T(x). For M=2, optimal
positions of the two RSUs are shown in Figure 5.3.

5.2.3

Balloon Optimization

In this optimization method RSUs are considered as balloons, where the balloon boundaries
represent the coverage area of an RSU. Let a and b be the balloon boundaries of an RSU such that 0
≤ a ≤ b ≤ L. The average reporting time for each side is considered independently; Ta(x) and Tb(x)
for side bounded by a and b respectively, and their formulas are:
∫ (

)

∫ (
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)

(5.3)
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Figure 5.2: T(x) (Simple method) for M=1. (a) Flat (b) Step (c) Stair
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Figure 5.3: Optimal RSU positions (Simple method) for M=2. (a) Flat (b) Step (c) Stair

Initially, RSUs are positioned uniformly along the highway, with a=b=x and Ta(x)=Tb(x)=0. In each
optimization iteration, the T(x) on both sides of each balloon is incremented by a small value; each
balloon is then expanded independently on both sides (i.e., a and b are increased) such that the
computed value of T(x) on both sides equals the newly incremented value. Note that the expansion
of a balloon on both sides may not be uniform. For example, the side with lower values of f(x) will
expand more. The process is repeated till the balloon touches another RSU/balloon or the highway
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boundary. The expanded balloons are then repositioned such that each balloon is equidistant from
other balloons or highway boundaries (in a similar way like multiple balloons bounce with each
other in a constrained space). The process is then repeated all over again. The process continues till
there is no more space for expansion of balloons. The position of RSUs at this point is the optimal
solution. Optimal RSU positions for M=1 and M=2 are shown in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.4: Optimal RSU positions (Balloon method) for M=1. (a) Flat (b) Step (c) Stair
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Figure 5.5: Optimal RSU positions (Balloon method) for M=2. (a) Flat (b) Step (c) Stair

5.2.4

Discussion

As shown in Figure 5.1, three different distributions of f(x) were especially chosen so that the
optimal positions of RSUs are intuitive. Figure 5.2 and 5.4 show optimal positions for M=1 and
Figure 5.3 and 5.5 show optimal positions for M=2. The simple (analytical) optimization method
finds optimal placement after exhaustively going through all the possible options (see Figure 5.2)
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and will thus be uneconomical for long highways or a large number of RSUs. Balloon optimization
heuristics on the other hand is much simpler and less complex. The optimal positions from both the
optimization methods closely match with each other and are also intuitive.

5.3

Optimal Placement of RSUs in Urban Areas

We present two different solutions to the RSUs placement problem with objective of maximizing
the information flow from vehicles to RSUs in an urban environment: Binary Integer Programming
(BIP) method and a novel Balloon Expansion Heuristic (BEH) method. BIP method utilizes branch
and bound method to find optimal solution, whereas, BEH method uses balloon expansion analogy
to find optimal solution. We have incorporated the vehicle density, vehicle speed, and the
occurrence likelihood of an incident/event in our optimization schemes. We present two separate
algorithms, based on different optimization goals, for each method. One algorithm aims at
minimizing the reporting time for a given number of RSUs; reporting time is defined as the time
duration from occurrence of an event till it is reported by a vehicle to an RSU. The other algorithm
aims at minimizing the number of RSUs required for deployment for a given reporting timing
constraint. Our proposed optimization schemes can easily be extended to applications that depend
on information flow from infrastructure to vehicles where the optimization goal can be area covered
within some reporting time bounds.

The scope of this part is restricted to urban environment such as the one shown in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6(a) shows a partial map of Miami, FL, USA. The map shows a grid of major roads (shown
in yellow and red color) and a number of smaller/local streets. The major roads are shared by all
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users/buses for commuting whereas the smaller streets are used only by users who need to visit a
particular home or business on that street. The traffic on smaller streets is therefore very
small/negligible as compared to that on major roads and we can safely ignore these for our system
model. Figure 5.6(a) can be approximated to a grid network of roads as shows in Figure 5.6(b) after
removing the local/smaller streets.

5.3.1

5.3.1.1

Optimization Problem Modeling

System Model

Consider the road network (shown in Figure 5.6(b)) as a graph with each intersection as a vertex and
each road segment as an edge. V is set of all vertices, let i  V (or vi  V). E is set of all edges, let j

E (or ej  E). Each road segment is further divided into many smaller sub-segments (each of length
) M is the set of all such sub-segments in the complete road network, let k M (or mk  M). For a
sub-segment k  M, let dk be the vehicle density (vehicles/Km), fk be the event/incident frequency
(number of events happened in a given time – frequency of events) and sk be the vehicle speed
(Km/hr). The densities and speed on all sub-segments k  ej cannot always be the same because of
different surface conditions (bumpy, slippery, etc), different gradient (steep climb, uphill, downhill,
etc), different geometry (curving, straight, etc) and proximity to road signals or stop signs etc.
Simplified event/incident distributions were considered to ease evaluation.

The event/incident distribution functions for the road network of Figure 5.6(b) that will be
evaluated in this chapter are shown in Figure 5.7. Figure 5.7(a) shows a distribution where the
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likelihood of an event/incident changes from one road to another but is constant over one
particular road. This can be the case when roads have different characteristics such as road widths,
speed limits, vehicle densities, and neighborhoods. Figure 5.7(b) shows a distribution where the
likelihood of an event/incident, in addition to changing from one road to another road, also changes
over every road. This corresponds to the more realistic scenario where events/incidents are more
likely to happen around intersections than in the road sub-segments that are far away from
intersections.

If vehicles entering the region follow Poisson distribution then there will be λk = sk dk vehicles
entering the sub-segment k  M (or mk  M) per unit time. If y (y M) is the location of an
incident/event then a vehicle will reach the point of incident with an exponentially distributed time,
with an average value of 1/λy. If x (x V) is the location of an RSU, then the reporting time, t(x,y)
(time for a vehicle to report an incident happened at location y to an RSU at location x) will be the
summation of the time for a vehicle to reach location y (ty) and the time for the vehicle to reach x
from y (tyx), see Equation 5.4 and Figure 5.8.
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(b)
Figure 5.6: Urban environment. (a) Partial map of Miami, FL, USA. © OpenStreetMap contributors,
CC-BY-SA (b) Grid-road network approximation of Figure 5.4(a).
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(a)

(b)
Figure 5.7: Event/incident distribution functions: Relative frequency of events (z axis) at each
segment (x-y axes). (a) Stair (b) Wave
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(

(5.4)

)

where pyx is the probability that a vehicle at y M will travel to xV.

If there are more than one paths/routes from y to x, as will be the case in urban environment, then
should represent the average time taken by any vehicle at y M to travel to x

in Equation 5.4

V along all the possible routes. Its value is given by Equation 5.5.
∑

(5.5)

where z is the number of possible routes from y M to x V, Dz is the fraction of vehicles
travelling from y M to x V that use route z and tyxz is the time for the vehicle to reach x  V from
y M using route z.

Let N, n N, be the set of sub-segments forming a route from y M to x V. The average
reporting for any event/incident along this route is given by Equation 5.6. If a route contains more
than one sub-routes then we can use either the average travelling times (as given by Equation 5.5) or
just the most direct/shortest route.
∑

|

(5.6)

∑
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Figure 5.8: Reporting Time of an incident/event

5.3.1.2

Optimization Problem Modeling

Let C be the total number of sub-segments in a road network, i.e., n(M)=C and R be the total
number of intersections in a road network, i.e., n(V)=R (we use notation n(A) for number of
elements in set A). Each intersection is a candidate location for an RSU. If r is the desired number
of RSUs, τ is the desired average reporting time and α is the desired fraction of coverage in the road
network (m=αC is the number of covered sub-segments), then the two optimization problems can
be stated as follows:


Minimize the average reporting time: Minimize the average reporting time over each
route (or an upper bound on the average reporting time over any route) such that at most r
RSUs are placed among R candidate locations of set V and at least m out of C subsegments of set M are covered by these RSUs.



Minimize the number of RSUs: Minimize the number of RSUs placed among R
candidate locations of set V such that at least m out of C sub-segments of set M are
covered within τ average reporting time over each route (or an upper bound on the average
reporting time over any route).
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5.3.1.3

Problem Complexity

One possible optimization option is to exhaustively check all possible combinations to find an
optimal solution. The number of possible combinations for optimization problem 1 and 2 are given
by Equation 5.7 and Equation 5.8 respectively. The solutions that check all possible combinations to
find an optimal solution increasingly become inefficient with the increase in size of area/region. For
a 10Km x 10Km urban area with a grid-road topology, we may have a total road length of 100Km
and 25 intersections. For a sub-segment size of 250m, we will have a total of 400 sub-segments. If
we want to minimize the average reporting time for a total of r=5 RSUs and α=0.8 (80%) coverage,
the number of possible combinations will be 1.15 x 10313. And, if we want to minimize the number
of RSUs (≤ 9) for some average reporting time and 80% coverage, the number of possible
combinations will increase to 1.97 x 10397.
( )( ) { }

(5.7)

∑

(5.8)

( )( ) { }

Where, ( ) is combinations that gives the number of subsets with size m when picking from a larger
set of size C, and { } is the Stirling numbers of the second kind that gives the number of ways to partition
a set of m elements into r nonempty (and non-distinct) subsets [1]. It is given by Equation 5.9.
{ }

∑

( )

(5.9)
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5.3.2

5.3.2.1

Optimization Schemes

Binary Integer Programming (BIP) Optimization

The linear programming formalizations are not aware of the road topology so we need to relax the
condition of the average reporting time that is defined over a single path/route to the average
reporting time defined over entire region. The two performance metrics are not the same but the
relaxation helps us to solve the optimization problem analytically using linear programming. It is
important to note that averaging over entire region is more relaxed; it may include some routes
whose average reporting time will be greater than the average reporting time over the entire region.

M is the set of all sub-segments in the road network, let (k M); and V is the set of all intersections
(candidate RSU locations), let (i V). Let Nk be the number of incidents happening on any subsegment k M and Aki be the reporting time of an incident at sub-segment k M to an RSU i V.
Let yi and xki be two binary decision variable; such that, yi equals to 1 if RSU i V exists and 0
otherwise and xki equals to 1 if sub-segment k M is covered by RSU i V and 0 otherwise. The
two optimization problem formulizations are as follows:

5.3.2.1.1 Minimize the Average Reporting Time (BIP-I)

The optimization goal is to minimize the average reporting time for a given number of RSUs and
area coverage. As discussed earlier, we have relaxed the minimization of the average reporting time
over each route constraint and replaced it with the average reporting time over the entire region.
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Specifically, here we minimize the total reporting time over the entire region. The binary integer
programming formalization of this optimization problem is given in Figure 5.9.

∑∑

∑
∑
∑
{

}
{

}


∑
∑∑

Figure 5.9: Formulization BIP-I: Minimizing total reporting time f(r) for given r number of RSUs
and α area coverage. For 100% coverage, the constraints are (1) to (5); for 100α percentage of
coverage, the constraints are (1), (2b), (3), (4), (5) and (6).

Constraint (1) requires that the number of RSUs should be less than or equal to the desired value (r).
Constraint (2) requires that each sub-segment is assigned to one or more than one RSUs, this
ensures 100% coverage. Constraint (3) ensures that sub-segments are assigned to only those RSUs
that are included in the solution. Constraints (2b and 6) replace constraint (2) if the required
coverage is less than 100% coverage but equal to or greater than some coverage threshold (given by
αC).
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5.3.2.1.2 Minimize the Number of RSUs (BIP-II)

The optimization goal is to minimize the total number of RSUs for given average reporting time
and area coverage. Average reporting time over each route has been relaxed to average reporting
time over entire region/area. The binary integer programming formalization of this problem is given
in Figure 5.10.

∑


∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑
∑
{

}
{

}


∑
∑∑

Figure 5.10: Formulization BIP-II: Minimizing total number of RSUs f(τ) for given τ reporting time
(average reporting time over the entire region) and α area coverage. For 100% coverage, the
constraints are (1) to (5); for 100α percentage of coverage, the constraints are (1), (2b), (3), (4), (5)
and (6).

Constraint (1) requires that the average reporting time over entire region is less than or equal to the
average reporting time threshold (τ). Constraint (2) requires that each sub-segment is assigned to one
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or more than one RSUs, this ensures 100% coverage, i.e., all sub-segments are assigned to some
RSU. Constraint (3) ensures that sub-segments are assigned to only those RSUs that are included in
the solution. Constraints (2b and 6) replace constraint (2) if the required coverage is less than 100%
coverage but equal to or greater than some coverage threshold (given by αC).

5.3.2.2 Balloon Expansion Heuristic (BEH) Optimization

In this optimization, each RSU and its coverage area is considered as a balloon that dynamically
expands in a two dimensional space. A balloon’s boundary represents the area covered by an RSU
within a given average reporting time. The balloons are dynamically expanded as we gradually relax
the average reporting time constraint till the desired percentage/fraction of area is covered by them.

The roads inside a balloon’s boundary at any time include all the segments that can be covered by
the RSU within some average reporting time via some route/path. The balloon expansion follows
road network and the expansion is independent on each side, that is, if the RSU is located at an
intersection then the balloon boundary on each of the four sides will expand independent of other
three sides. The expansion depends on vehicle speed, vehicle density, event/incident distribution
and probability of vehicles following a route. The segments, along a route, with high frequency of
events/incidents will have more impact on computing the average reporting time than those with
low frequency of events.

Figure 5.11 shows a road intersection where an RSU is located; A, B, C, and D is the balloon
boundary for some average reporting time (τ). Initially, |XA|=|XB|=|XC|=|XD|=0, i.e., points
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{A, B, C, D} are located at X and T(x,a)=T(x,b)=T(x,c)=T(x,d)=0, where T(x,y) is the average reporting time
along path XY including point Y. The balloon is then expanded independently on all four routes for
some average reporting time (τ). The size of expansion on each route will vary depending on vehicle
speed, vehicle density, incident/event distribution and probability of vehicles following a route.
Figure 5.11 shows a balloon expansion where |XA|=|XD|≤|XC|≤|XB|.

C
T(x,c)

A

T(x,a)

T(x,b)

X

T(x,d)
D

B

T(x,a)=T(x,b)=T(x,c)=T(x,d)= τ
|XA|=|XD|≤|XC|≤|XB|

Figure 5.11: Balloon expansion: The expansion is independent along each direction and depends on
vehicle speed, vehicle density, event/incident distribution and probability of vehicles following a
route. |XA|,|XD|,|XC|, and |XB| give the size of expansion towards A, B, C and D respectively
for τ average reporting time over each route.

Unrestricted expansions may form loops especially in urban environment. In order to avoid loops,
we assume that the boundary expansion of an RSU is towards the direction away from the RSU; if
the expansion encounters an intersection then it only continues in directions that are away from the
RSU. Figure 5.12 gives the average reporting times for an RSU located at the center of an urban
environment (Figure 5.6 (b)) for event/incident distributions given at Figure 5.7.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 5.12: Average reporting times, for different event/incident distributions, of urban
environment given at Figure 5.6(b). (a) Stair (b) Wave
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BEH optimization method, in general, starts with placing an RSU at each candidate location. The
coverage of each RSU is then expanded on each side (along each route) for some value of average
response time. The expansion continues till a sufficient number of sub-segments are covered by
more than one neighboring RSUs (or the average reporting time threshold has reached). At this
moment, the RSU with the least “impact factor” is removed (similar to the bursting of a balloon due
to the too tight compression from neighboring balloons). The process repeats until the optimization
objective is achieved. The impact factor of an RSU is the number of sub-segments that will not be
covered if the RSU is removed; it is computed by subtracting the number of overlapped-subsegments (sub-segments that are covered by this RSU and also by some other RSUs) from the
number of sub-segments covered by this RSU.

5.3.2.2.1 Minimize the Average Reporting Time (BEH-I)

The BEH algorithm for this optimization problem is given in Figure 5.13. The optimization
objective is to minimize the average reporting time over each route (or the upper bound on average
reporting time over any route) for given number of RSUs (r) and area coverage (αC). The method
starts with placing an RSU at each candidate location (line 2), the average reporting time (of each
route) is then iteratively incremented by a small value (line 5-8) until area coverage constraint is met
(line 9-10). The impact factor of each RSU is calculated (line 11-13) and the one with the least
impact factor (line 14-15) is removed provided the removal does not affect area coverage constraint
(line 16-19); otherwise the average reporting time (of each route) will be further incremented (line 58). The process continues until the number of RSU constraint is met (line 4).
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

{ }

16.
{

}

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
Figure 5.13: Algorithm BEH-I: Minimizing average reporting time over each route (i.e., the upper
bound on average reporting time over any route) for given number of RSUs and area coverage.
After the algorithm finishes, τ' gives the upper bound on the average reporting time over any route.
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5.3.2.2.2 Minimize the number of RSUs (BEH-II)

BEH algorithm for this optimization problem is given in Figure 5.14. The optimization objective is
to minimize the number of RSUs for a given average reporting time over each route (or an upper
bound on the average reporting time over any route) (τ) and area coverage (αC). The method starts
with placing an RSU at each candidate location (line 2). The coverage balloons of all the RSUs are
then expanded till the average response time is equal to the desired value (line 4-6). The combined
coverage is checked against desired coverage (line 7-9). The impact factor of each RSU is calculated
(line 13-15) and the one with the least impact factor (line 16-17) is removed provided that the
removal does not affect area coverage constraint (line 18-19, 11-12). Impact factors are then
recalculated and a fresh sorted list is generated. The process stops when removing an RSU will
dissatisfy the area coverage constraint (line 11).
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Figure 5.14: Algorithm BEH-II: Minimizing the total number of RSUs for given average reporting
time over each route (i.e., the upper bound on average reporting time over any route) and area
coverage
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5.3.3

5.3.3.1

Simulation Results and Discussion

Simulation Setup

The simulation is based on an urban region with five vertical and five horizontal roads, as shown in
Figure 5.6(b). The region is 3 Km x 3 Km, with a total road length of 30 Km. The sub-segment size
is 250m, resulting in a total of 120 sub-segments. There are a total of 25 intersections; in order to
reduce problem complexity for BIP methods (explained earlier), only 9 out of the 25 intersections
are considered as candidate locations for RSUs (refer Figure 5.6(b)). Two different incident/event
distributions are defined, as shown in Figure 5.7. Figure 5.7(a) shows a distribution where the
likelihood of an event/incident changes from one road to another but is constant over one
particular road. This can be the case when roads have different characteristics such as road widths,
speed limits, vehicle densities, and neighborhoods. Figure 5.7(b) shows a distribution where the
likelihood of an event/incident, in addition to changing from one road to another road, also changes
over every road. This corresponds to the more realistic scenario where events/incidents are more
likely to happen around intersections than in the road sub-segments that are far away from
intersections.

Vehicles entering the region follow Poisson distribution, with λ=SD vehicles entering any subsegment per unit time. A constant vehicle density of D = 4vehicle/Km and a constant speed of S =
50Km/hr is assumed for this simulation. The probability that a vehicle at a point of event/incident
will travel to a particular RSU is considered to be inversely proportional to the number of
intersections (or routes) between the vehicle and the RSU. The most direct and shortest path is used
to calculate the reporting time of an event/incident to a particular RSU; only the vehicles following
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that route are considered in computing the average reporting time and the contribution by the rest
of vehicles for reporting the event/incident is ignored (which, if considered, may improve the
event/incident reporting likelihood). It is important to note that in real scenarios/applications
vehicle traces can be used to generate all these statistics; the statistics based on vehicle traces are
generally reliable as daily traffic patterns are often repeated.

In order to study how well our proposed optimization methods perform, enumeration method was
used to exhaustively search for the true optimal solution. As discussed earlier, enumeration method
increasingly becomes inefficient with the increase in size of area/region. In order to reduce the
number of combinations to be checked to find an optimal solution, so that we can actually finish the
enumerating operation using personal computers, the average reporting time over each route
constraint was relaxed and was replaced with the average reporting time over the entire region. With
this relaxation, we can simply consider a segment to be covered by one RSU (out of all the currently
considered RSUs) that has minimum reporting time from that segment instead of considering all of
RSUs.

The specifications of system used for simulation are: Processor - Intel® CoreTM2 Quad CPU Q6700
@ 2.66 GHz, RAM - 4 GB, Hard Disk - 232 GB (200 GB free), and Operating System - Windows 7
Enterprise 64-bit.
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5.3.3.2 Results

5.3.3.2.1 Enumeration/Exhaustive Search

The minimum average reporting time (over the entire region) for different number of RSUs, using
enumeration/exhaustive search for different event/incident distributions of urban environment
given at Figure 5.6(b), are shown in Figure 5.15. The result covers all possible number of RSUs,
refer Equation 5.8, therefore it can be used to find the minimum number of RSUs required for a
given average reporting time (over the entire region). For example, as shown in Figure 5.15, a
minimum of 5 RSUs will be required for an average reporting time of 150 sec.

Figure 5.15: Minimum average reporting time (over the entire region) for different number of RSUs
using enumeration/ exhaustive search for different event/incident distributions of urban
environment given at Figure 5.6(b).

157

5.3.3.2.2 Binary Integer Programming (BIP) Optimization

The optimal placements of RSUs for minimizing the total reporting time for different numbers of
RSUs (BIP-I) are shown in Figure 5.16.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 5.16: Optimal RSU placements using BIP-I (minimizing total reporting time for given
number of RSUs and area coverage): (a) Number of RSUs = 3 (b) Number of RSUs = 6 (c) Number
of RSUs = 8

The minimum average reporting time (over the entire region) for different number of RSUs, using
BIP-I for different event/incident distributions of urban environment given at Figure 5.6, is shown
in Figure 5.17. The minimum average reporting time over the entire region of BIP-I is the same as
that of enumeration/exhaustive search solution.

The minimum average reporting time over each route (or an upper bound on the average reporting
time over any route) for different number of RSUs, corresponding to optimal solutions of BIP-I for
different event/incident distributions of urban environment given at Figure 5.6, are shown in Figure
5.18. The minimum average reporting time over each path of BIP-I is higher than that of BEH-I.
The execution times for BIP-I is given in Figure 5.21.
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Optimal placement of RSUs for minimizing the total number of RSUs (BIP-II) did not converge to a
feasible solution within reasonable time (≤ 4 days).

(a)

(b)
Figure 5.17: Minimum average reporting time (over the entire region) for different number of RSUs
and different event/incident distributions of urban environment given at Figure 5.6(b). (a) Stair (b)
Wave
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(a)

(b)
Figure 5.18: Minimum average reporting time over each route (or an upper bound on the average
reporting time over any route) for different event/incident distributions of urban environment given
at Figure 5.6 (b). (a) Stair (b) Wave
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5.3.3.2.3 Balloon Expansion Heuristic (BEH) Optimization

The optimal placements of RSUs for minimizing the average response time over each route (or an
upper bound on the average reporting time over any route) for different numbers of RSUs (BEH-I)
are shown in Figure 5.19.

The minimum average reporting time over each route (or an upper bound on the average reporting
time over any route) for different number of RSUs, using BEH-I for different event/incident
distributions of urban environment given at Figure 5.6, are shown in Figure 5.18. The minimum
average reporting time over each path achieved by BEH-I is better than that of BIP-I.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 5.19: Optimal RSU placements using BEH-I (minimizing average reporting time over each
route, or an upper bound on the average reporting time over any route, for given number of RSUs
and area coverage): (a) Number of RSUs = 3 (b) Number of RSUs = 6 (c) Number of RSUs = 8

The minimum average reporting time (over the entire region) for different number of RSUs,
corresponding to optimal solutions of BEH-I for different event/incident distributions of urban
environment given at Figure 5.6, are shown in Figure 5.17. The minimum average reporting time
over the entire region achieved by BEH-I closely follows that of enumeration/exhaustive search.
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The optimal placement of RSUs for minimizing number of RSUs for different reporting times
(BEH-II) is shown in Figure 5.20. The execution times for both the BEH algorithms are given in
Figure 5.21 and 5.22.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 5.20: Optimal RSU placements using BEH-II (minimizing total number of RSUs for given
average reporting time over each route and area coverage) : (a) Average Reporting time ≤ 180 secs
(b) Average Reporting time ≤ 150 secs (c) Average Reporting time ≤ 130 secs

Figure 5.21: Execution times for BEH-I and BIP-1 for different number of desired RSUs
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5.3.3.3 Discussion

BIP-I successfully produced optimal solutions. The minimum average reporting time over the entire
region is the same as that of enumeration/exhaustive search (Figure 5.17). However, the minimum
average reporting time over each path is higher than that of BEH-I (Figure 5.18).

Figure 5.22: Execution times for BEH-II for different average reporting times

BIP-II did not produce feasible solution within reasonable time. BIP optimizations use branch and
bound algorithm to solve the problems; the branch and bound algorithm uses binary search tree
whose size grows tremendously with the increase in size of a problem. The failure of BIP-II to
converge within reasonable time may be due to reason that, in worst cases, branch and bound
algorithm searches all possible combinations to find the best solution [2] and we have already shown
in section 5.3.1.3 that the number of possible combinations for this problem is very large (>10122).

One possible solution is to iteratively use BIP-I to solve BIP-II. The BIP-II optimization problem
can be restated as: Find the smallest number of RSUs satisfying the average reporting time
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constraint (τ). A simple way is to repeatedly use BIP-I, with decreasing numbers of RSUs, to find the
smallest number of RSUs that gives a minimum reporting time satisfying the timing constraint. The
number of BIP-I computations can be reduced by employing various search methods such as binary
search. The binary-search based algorithm is listed in the Figure 5.23.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

⌊

⌋

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
Figure 5.23: Algorithm BIP-II.I (Using Binary search and BIP-I): Minimizing total number of RSUs
for a given average reporting time constraint and area coverage

BEH algorithms incorporate the knowledge of road topology to find the optimal solution. Both the
BEH algorithms successfully produced optimal solutions. The execution times for both the BEH
methods are much less than that of BIP-I method (refer Figure 5.21 and 5.22).

164

In addition, the minimum average reporting time over each path achieved by BEH is better than
that of BIP-I (Figure 5.18). The minimum average reporting time over the entire region achieved by
BEH closely follows that of enumeration/exhaustive search (Figure 5.17).

BEH-I removes RSUs as it increments the average reporting time. The selection of an RSU to be
removed, at any stage, may vary with the size of average reporting time increment. A smaller
increment size gives higher resolution on minimum average reporting time, whereas a larger
increment size may result in more global optimization. BEH-I removes RSUs after incrementing the
average reporting time to the desired threshold. It then greedily removes RSUs with the least impact
factors; this RSU removal can also be modeled as a knapsack problem [14], in future work, for more
fine grained solutions.

The RSU removal sequence, in both the BEH algorithms, may later be utilized for incrementally
deploying RSUs. BEH algorithms provide the optimal RSU placement for a given (or minimum)
number of RSUs, later if we want to add more RSUs to the region, then they can be deployed at
locations that were removed last. BEH-I can also be used to find marginal improvement in average
reporting time for each added RSUs.

BEH algorithms use average reporting time over a path as a timing constraint. Average reporting time
over a path is more useful metric then average reporting time over entire region; it guarantees that
on average an event/incident will be reported within the timing constraint whereas the average
reporting time over entire region cannot guarantee this.
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5.4

Conclusion

We have presented an optimization schemes for two different environments: along highways and in
urban areas. For highways, the optimization aims to minimize the average reporting time of an
event/incident by a vehicle to a nearby RSU. Our optimization scheme is based on balloon
expansion analogy, where the expansion in each direction is related to vehicle speed, vehicle density
and likelihood of incidents/events. We have shown that our balloon optimization scheme performs
equally well as the exhaustive optimization scheme. For urban areas, we have presented two
optimization methods: Binary Integer Programming (BIP) method and Balloon Expansion Heuristic
(BEH) method. Both optimization methods were used to solve two optimization problems:
minimizing the average reporting time and minimizing the number of required RSUs. We have
shown that the novel BEH method is more versatile and can be used to solve both the optimization
problems without any further relaxations.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Need of ubiquitous connectivity has brought connectivity to vehicles, resulting in formation of
VANET. A lot of work has been done in this area and various applications, protocols and standards
have been developed. Most of the applications and services assume a mature VANET with
pervasive roadside infrastructure and large number of smart vehicles. But, during the initial
deployment stages of VANET there will be very scarce roadside infrastructure and very limited
number of smart vehicles on the road. Therefore, in order to bootstrap VANET and make VANET
an attractive investment for both the service providers and consumers there is a need to develop
various solutions that do not depend on pervasive roadside infrastructure or a large number of
vehicles. We have proposed various solutions that are viable even with very scarce roadside
infrastructure and very limited number of smart vehicles. These solutions are economical, scalable,
and deployable and will help in stimulating VANET activity and its adoption.

The contributions of this dissertation are summarized below.


Design of a VANET architecture that does not need expensive roadside infrastructure or
large number of smart vehicles, can provide services with limited number of heterogeneous
roadside units and smart vehicles with varying capabilities, is scalable and deployable.



Provision of backend connectivity to Internet to smart vehicles without requiring pervasive
roadside infrastructure or large number of smart vehicles, especially in rural areas and along
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highways. Satellite down-only link is incorporated to provide connectivity during long
intervals between RSUs.


Design of security architecture that does not depend on pervasive roadside infrastructure or
a fully connected V2V network. The architecture is economical, scalable and deployable.
Two architectures have been proposed: a service oriented and a general purpose. Both
architectures fulfill the security requirements.



Optimal placement of limited number of RSUs within a given area to provide best possible
service to smart vehicles. The optimal placement solution covers both environments: the
urban areas and the highways. A novel heuristic optimization solution has been proposed
that performs near optimal results without needing extensive resources as that required by
exhaustive search optimization solutions.
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